

The Essence of Spinoza's Ethics

ADDITIONAL REFERENCES

Appendix A

Part I.....Pg. 2-6

Appendix B

Part IIPg. 7-22

Part III.....Pg. 23-45

Part IV.....Pg. 46-52

Appendix C

Part VPg. 53-56

This section contains Propositions, Notes, Corollaries, Definitions, Axioms, and Postulates which are referenced but have been cut from the text.

Ed. note: Spinoza breaks the book into Parts, which are indicated by Roman numerals. Within those Parts are various other elements: propositions (indicated by standalone Arabic numerals), notes (indicated by an **n** if there is only one note, or **n1**, **n2**, **n3** and so forth, if there is more than one note), corollaries (indicated by a **c**, followed by a numeral if there is more than one corollary), definitions (**def**), axioms (**ax**), postulates (**post**), and, in one section, specific definitions of emotions (**emot**). So the shorthand reference for “Part I, Prop. 16, and Prop. 32, Corollary” would be “**I: 16, 32 c**,” whereas a reference to “**V: 31; I: ax3**” would mean “Part V, Proposition 31, and Part I, Axiom 3.”

Appendix A

Part I: Concerning God

Definitions

1. By that which is *self-caused*, I mean that of which the essence involves existence, or that of which the nature is only conceivable as existent.
2. A thing is called *finite after its kind*, when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature; for instance, a body is called finite because we always conceive another greater body. So, also, a thought is limited by another thought, but a body is not limited by thought, nor a thought by body.
3. By *substance*, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception.
4. By *attribute*, I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.
5. By *mode*, I mean the modifications of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself.
6. By *God*, I mean a being absolutely infinite—that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality.

Explanation: I say absolutely infinite, not infinite after its kind: for, of a thing infinite only after its kind, infinite attributes may be denied; but that which is absolutely infinite, contains in its essence whatever expresses reality, and involves no negation.

7. That thing is called free, which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action.
8. By *eternity*, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of that which is eternal.

Explanation: Existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal truth, like the essence of a thing, and, therefore, cannot be explained by means of continuance or time, though continuance may be conceived without a beginning or end.

Axioms

1. Everything which exists exists either in itself or in something else.
2. That which cannot be conceived through anything else must be conceived through itself.
3. From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows; and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is impossible that an effect can follow.
4. The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause.
5. Things which have nothing in common cannot be understood, the one by means of the other; the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other.
6. A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.
7. If a thing can be conceived as non-existing, its essence does not involve existence.

Propositions

- Prop. 1: Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.
- Prop. 2: Two substances, whose attributes are different, have nothing in common.
- Prop. 3: Things, which have nothing in common, cannot be one the cause of the other.
- Prop. 4: Two or more distinct things are distinguished one from the other either by the difference of the attributes of the substances, or by the difference of their modifications.
- Prop. 5: There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute.
- Prop. 6: One substance cannot be produced by another substance.
- Prop. 7: Existence belongs to the nature of substance.
- Prop. 8: Every substance is necessarily infinite.
- Prop. 9: The more reality or being a thing has, the greater the number of its attributes.
- Prop. 10: Each particular attribute of the one substance must be conceived through itself.
- Prop. 11: God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists.
- Prop. 12: No attribute of substance can be conceived, from which it would follow that substance can be divided.

Prop. 13: Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.

Prop. 14: Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.

Corollary 1: Clearly, therefore: 1. God is one, that is (by I: def6) only one substance can be granted in the universe, and that substance is absolutely infinite, as we have already indicated (in the note to Prop. x.).

Corollary 2: It follows: 2. That extension and thought are either attributes of God or (by I: ax1) accidents (*affectiones*) of the attributes of God.

Prop. 15: Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived.

Prop. 16: From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways—that is, all things which fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.

Prop. 17: God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not constrained by anyone.

Prop. 18: God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things.

Prop. 19: God and all the attributes of God are eternal.

Prop. 20: The existence of God and his essence are one and the same.

Corollary 2: Secondly, it follows that God, and all the attributes of God, are unchangeable. For if they could be changed in respect to existence, they must also be able to be changed in respect to essence—that is, obviously, be changed from true to false, which is absurd.

Prop. 21: All things, which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God, must always exist and be infinite, or in other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute.

Prop. 22: Whatever follows from any attribute of God, in so far as it is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily and as infinite through the said attribute, must also exist necessarily and as infinite.

Prop. 23: Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by a modification, which exists necessarily and as infinite.

Prop. 24: The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence.

Corollary: Hence it follows that God is not only the cause of things coming into existence, but also of their continuing in existence, that is, in scholastic phraseology, God is cause of the being of things (*essendi rerum*). For whether things exist, or do not exist, whenever we contemplate their essence, we see that it involves neither existence nor duration;

consequently, it cannot be the cause of either the one or the other. God must be the sole cause, inasmuch as to him alone does existence appertain. (I: 14c) QED.

Prop. 25: God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence.

Corollary: Individual things are nothing but modifications of the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God are expressed in a fixed and definite manner. The proof appears from I: 15, def5.

Prop. 26: A thing, which is conditioned to act in a particular manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God; and that which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to act.

Prop. 27: A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act in a particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.

Prop. 28: Every individual thing, or everything which is finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by a cause other than itself, which also is finite and has a conditioned existence; and likewise this cause cannot in its turn exist or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by another cause, which also is finite and has a conditioned existence, and so on to infinity.

Prop. 29: Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature.

Prop. 30: Intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God, and nothing else.

Prop. 31: The intellect in function, whether finite or infinite, as will, desire, love, etc., should be referred to passive nature, and not to active nature.

Prop. 32: Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary cause.

Corollary 1: Hence it follows, first, that God does not act according to freedom of the will.

Corollary 2: It follows, secondly, that will and intellect stand in the same relation to the nature of God as do motion, and rest, and absolutely all natural phenomena, which must be conditioned by God (I: 29) to exist and act in a particular manner. For will, like the rest, stands in need of a cause, by which it is conditioned to exist and act in a particular manner. And although, when will or intellect be granted, an infinite number of results may follow, yet God cannot on that account be said to act from freedom of the will, any more than the infinite number of results from motion and rest would justify us in saying that motion and rest act by free will. Wherefore will no more appertains to God than does anything else in nature, but stands in the same relation to him as motion, rest, and the like, which we have shown to

follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and to be conditioned by it to exist and act in a particular manner.

Prop. 33: Things could not have been brought into being by God in any manner or in any order different from that which has in fact obtained.

Note 1: As I have thus shown, more clearly than the sun at noonday, that there is nothing to justify us in calling things contingent, I wish to explain briefly what meaning we shall attach to the word contingent; but I will first explain the words necessary and impossible.

A thing is called necessary either in respect to its essence or in respect to its cause; for the existence of a thing necessarily follows, either from its essence and definition, or from a given efficient cause. For similar reasons a thing is said to be impossible; namely, inasmuch as its essence or definition involves a contradiction, or because no external cause is granted, which is conditioned to produce such an effect; but a thing can in no respect be called contingent, save in relation to the imperfection of our knowledge.

A thing of which we do not know whether the essence does or does not involve a contradiction, or of which, knowing that it does not involve a contradiction, we are still in doubt concerning the existence, because the order of causes escapes us,—such a thing, I say, cannot appear to us either necessary or impossible. Wherefore we call it contingent or possible.

Prop. 34: God's power is identical with his essence.

Prop. 35: Whatsoever we conceive to be in the power of God, necessarily exists.

Prop. 36: There is no cause from whose nature some effect does not follow.

Appendix B

Part II: Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind

Definitions

1. By *body* I mean a mode which expresses in a certain determinate manner the essence of God, in so far as he is considered as an extended thing. (See I: 25 c)

2. I consider as belonging to the essence of a thing that, which being given, the thing is necessarily given also, and, which being removed, the thing is necessarily removed also; in other words, that without which the thing, and which itself without the thing, can neither be nor be conceived.

3. By *idea*, I mean the mental conception which is formed by the mind as a thinking thing.

Explanation: I say *conception* rather than perception, because the word perception seems to imply that the mind is passive in respect to the object; whereas conception seems to express an activity of the mind.

4. By *an adequate idea*, I mean an idea which, in so far as it is considered in itself, without relation to the object, has all the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea.

Explanation: I say *intrinsic*, in order to exclude that mark which is extrinsic, namely, the agreement between the idea and its object (*ideatum*).

5. *Duration* is the indefinite continuance of existing.

Explanation: I say *indefinite*, because it cannot be determined through the existence itself of the existing thing, or by its efficient cause, which necessarily gives the existence of the thing, but does not take it away.

6. *Reality* and *perfection* I use as synonymous terms.

7. By *particular things*, I mean things which are finite and have a conditioned existence; but if several individual things concur in one action, so as to be all simultaneously the effect of one cause, I consider them all, so far, as one particular thing.

Propositions

Prop. 1: Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.

Prop. 2: Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing.

Prop. 3: In God there is necessarily the idea, not only of his essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from his essence.

Prop. 4: The idea of God, from which an infinite number of things follow in infinite ways, can only be one.

Prop. 5: The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only in so far as he is considered as thinking thing, not in so far as he is unfolded in any other attribute; that is, the ideas both of the attributes of God and of particular things do not own as their efficient cause their objects, or the things perceived, but God himself, in so far as he is a thinking thing.

Prop. 6: The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in so far as he is considered through the attribute of which they are modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any other attribute.

Prop. 7: The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.

Corollary: Hence God's power of thinking is equal to his realized power of action—that is, whatsoever follows from the infinite nature of God in the world of extension (*formaliter*), follows without exception in the same order and connection from the idea of God in the world of thought (*objective*).

Note: Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind what has been pointed out above—namely, that whatsoever can be perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance, belongs altogether only to one substance: consequently, substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute, now through the other. So, also, a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, though expressed in two ways. This truth seems to have been dimly recognized by those Jews who maintained that God, God's intellect, and the things understood by God are identical. For instance, a circle existing in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is also in God, are one and the same thing displayed through different attributes. Thus, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one and the same chain of causes—that is, the same things following in either case.

I said that God is the cause of an idea—for instance, of the idea of a circle,—in so far as he is a thinking thing; and of a circle, in so far as he is an extended thing, simply because the actual being of the idea of a circle can only be perceived as a proximate cause through another mode of thinking, and that again through another, and so on to infinity; so that, so long as we consider things as modes of thinking, we must explain the order of the whole of nature, or the whole chain of causes, through the attribute of thought only. And, in so far as we consider things as modes of extension, we must explain the order of the whole of nature through the attribute of extension only; and so on, in the case of other attributes. Wherefore of things as they are in themselves God is really the cause, inasmuch as he consists of infinite attributes. I cannot for the present explain my meaning more clearly.

Prop. 8: The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do not exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes are contained in the attributes of God.

Corollary: Hence, so long as particular things do not exist, except in so far as they are comprehended in the attributes of God, their representations in thought or ideas do not exist, except in so far as the infinite idea of God exists; and when particular things are said to exist, not only in so far as they are involved in the attributes of God, but also in so far as they are said to continue, their ideas will also involve existence, through which they are said to continue.

Note: If anyone desires an example to throw more light on this question, I shall, I fear, not be able to give him any, which adequately explains the thing of which I here speak, inasmuch as it is unique; however, I will endeavor to illustrate it as far as possible. The nature of a circle is such that if any number of straight lines intersect within it, the rectangles formed by their segments will be equal to one another; thus, infinite equal rectangles are contained in a circle. Yet none of these rectangles can be said to exist, except in so far as the circle exists; nor can the idea of any of these rectangles be said to exist, except in so far as they are comprehended in the idea of the circle. Let us grant that, from this infinite number of rectangles, two only exist. The ideas of these two not only exist, in so far as they are contained in the idea of the circle, but also as they involve the existence of those rectangles; wherefore they are distinguished from the remaining ideas of the remaining rectangles.

Prop. 9: The idea of an individual thing actually existing is caused by God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is considered, as affected by another idea of a thing actually existing, of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affected by a third idea, and so on to infinity.

Prop. 10: The being of substance does not appertain to the essence of man—in other words, substance does not constitute the actual being of man.

Prop. 11: The first element, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is the idea of some particular thing actually existing.

Corollary: Hence it follows, that the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God; thus when we say, that the human mind perceives this or that, we make the assertion, that God has this or that idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind, or in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind; and when we say that God has this or that idea, not only in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind, but also in so far as he, simultaneously with the human mind, has the further idea of another thing, we assert that the human mind perceives a thing in part or inadequately.

Prop. 12: Whatsoever comes to pass in the object of the idea, which constitutes the human mind, must be perceived by the human mind, or there will necessarily be an idea in the human mind of the said occurrence. That is, if the object of the idea constituting the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in that body without being perceived by the mind.

Prop. 13: The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, in other words a certain mode of extension which actually exists, and nothing else.

Lemma 2: *All bodies agree in certain respects.*

Proof: All bodies agree in the fact, that they involve the conception of one and the same attribute (II: def1). Further, in the fact that they may be moved less or more quickly, and may be absolutely in motion or at rest.

Corollary: Hence it follows, that a body in motion keeps in motion, until it is determined to a state of rest by some other body; and a body at rest remains so, until it is determined to a state of motion by some other body. This is indeed self-evident. For when I suppose, for instance, that a given body, a, is at rest, and do not take into consideration other bodies in motion, I cannot affirm anything concerning the body a, except that it is at rest. If it afterwards comes to pass that a is in motion, this cannot have resulted from its having been at rest, for no other consequence could have been involved than its remaining at rest. If, on the other hand, a be given in motion, we shall, so long as we only consider a, be unable to affirm anything concerning it, except that it is in motion. If a is subsequently found to be at rest, this rest cannot be the result of a's previous motion, for such motion can only have led to continued motion; the state of rest therefore must have resulted from something, which was not in a, namely, from an external cause determining a to a state of rest.

Postulates

1. The human body is composed of a number of individual parts, of diverse nature, each one of which is in itself extremely complex.
2. Of the individual parts composing the human body some are fluid, some soft, some hard.
3. The individual parts composing the human body, and consequently the human body itself, are affected in a variety of ways by external bodies.
4. The human body stands in need for its preservation of a number of other bodies, by which it is continually, so to speak, regenerated.
5. When the fluid part of the human body is determined by an external body to impinge often on another soft part, it changes the surface of the latter, and, as it were, leaves the impression thereupon of the external body which impels it.
6. The human body can move external bodies, and arrange them in a variety of ways.

Propositions

Prop. 14: The human mind is capable of perceiving a great number of things, and is so, in proportion as its body is capable of receiving a great number of impressions.

Prop. 15: The idea, which constitutes the actual being of the human mind, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of ideas.

Prop. 16: The idea of every mode, in which the human body is affected by external bodies, must involve the nature of the human body, and also the nature of the external body.

Corollary 2: It follows, secondly, that the ideas, which we have of external bodies, indicate rather the constitution of our own body than the nature of external bodies. I have amply illustrated this in the Appendix to Part I.

Prop. 17: If the human body is affected in a manner which involves the nature of any external body, the human mind will regard the said external body as actually existing, or as present to itself, until the human body be affected in such a way as to exclude the existence of the said external body.

Corollary: The mind is able to regard as present external bodies, by which the human body has once been affected, even though they be no longer in existence or present.

Note: We thus see how it comes about, as is often the case, that we regard as present things which are not. It is possible that the same result may be brought about by other causes; but I think it suffices for me here to have indicated one possible explanation, just as well as if I had pointed out the true cause. Indeed, I do not think I am very far from the truth, for all my assumptions are based on postulates, which rest, almost without exception, on experience, that cannot be controverted by those who have shown, as we have, that the human body, as we feel it, exists (II: 13 c). Furthermore (II: 7 c, 16 c2), we clearly understand what is the difference between the idea, say, of Peter, which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind, and the idea of the said Peter, which is in another man, say, Paul. The former directly answers to the essence of Peter's own body, and only implies existence so long as Peter exists; the latter indicates rather the disposition of Paul's body than the nature of Peter, and, therefore, while this disposition of Paul's body lasts, Paul's mind will regard Peter as present to itself, even though he no longer exists. Further, to retain the usual phraseology, the modifications of the human body, of which the ideas represent external bodies as present to us, we will call the images of things, though they do not recall the figure of things. When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say that it imagines. I will here draw attention to the fact, in order to indicate where error lies, that the imaginations of the mind, looked at in themselves, do not contain error. The mind does not err in the mere act of imagining, but only in so far as it is regarded as being without the idea, which excludes the existence of such things as it imagines to be present to it. If the mind, while imagining non-existent things as present to it, is at the same time conscious that they do not really exist, this power of imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its nature, and not to a fault, especially if this faculty of imagination depend solely on its own nature—that is (I: def7), if this faculty of imagination be free.

Prop. 18: If the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time, when the mind afterwards imagines any of them, it will straightway remember the others also.

Note: We now clearly see what *Memory* is. It is simply a certain association of ideas involving the nature of things outside the human body, which association arises in the mind according to the order and association of the modifications (*affectiones*) of the human body. I say, first, it is an association of those ideas only, which involve the nature of things outside the human body: not of ideas which answer to the nature of the said things: ideas of the

modifications of the human body are, strictly speaking (II: 16), those which involve the nature both of the human body and of external bodies. I say, secondly, that this association arises according to the order and association of the modifications of the human body, in order to distinguish it from that association of ideas, which arises from the order of the intellect, whereby the mind perceives things through their primary causes, and which is in all men the same. And hence we can further clearly understand, why the mind from the thought of one thing, should straightway arrive at the thought of another thing, which has no similarity with the first; for instance, from the thought of the word *pomum* (an apple), a Roman would straightway arrive at the thought of the fruit apple, which has no similitude with the articulate sound in question, nor anything in common with it, except that the body of the man has often been affected by these two things; that is, that the man has often heard the word *pomum*, while he was looking at the fruit; similarly every man will go on from one thought to another, according as his habit has ordered the images of things in his body. For a soldier, for instance, when he sees the tracks of a horse in sand, will at once pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a horseman, and thence to the thought of war, c.; while a countryman will proceed from the thought of a horse to the thought of a plough, a field, c. Thus every man will follow this or that train of thought, according as he has been in the habit of conjoining and associating the mental images of things in this or that manner.

Prop. 19: The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does not know it to exist, save through the ideas of the modifications, whereby the body is affected.

Prop. 20: The idea or knowledge of the human mind is also in God, following in God in the same manner, and being referred to God in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the human body.

Prop. 21: This idea of the mind is united to the mind, in the same way as the mind is united to the body.

Note: This proposition is comprehended much more clearly from what we said in II: 7 n. We there showed that the idea of body and body, that is, mind and body (II: 13), are one and the same individual conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension; wherefore the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing, which is conceived under one and the same attribute, namely, thought. The idea of the mind, I repeat, and the mind itself are in God by the same necessity and follow from him from the same power of thinking. Strictly speaking, the idea of the mind, that is, the idea of an idea, is nothing but the distinctive quality (*forma*) of the idea in so far as it is conceived as a mode of thought without reference to the object; if a man knows anything, he, by that very fact, knows that he knows it, and at the same time knows that he knows that he knows it, and so on to infinity. But I will treat of this hereafter.

Prop. 22: The human mind perceives not only the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of such modifications.

Prop. 23: The mind does not know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body.

Prop. 24: The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body.

Prop. 25: The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the external body.

Corollary: In so far as the human mind imagines an external body, it has not an adequate knowledge thereof.

Prop. 26: The human mind does not perceive any external body as actually existing, except through the ideas of the modifications of its own body.

Prop. 27: The idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body itself.

Prop. 28: The ideas of the modifications of the human body, in so far as they have reference only to the human mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused.

Note: The idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind is, in the same manner, proved not to be, when considered in itself alone, clear and distinct; as also is the case with the idea of the human mind, and the ideas of the ideas of the modifications of the human body, in so far as they are referred to the mind only, as everyone may easily see.

Prop. 29: The idea of the idea of each modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human mind.

Corollary: Hence it follows that the human mind, when it perceives things after the common order of nature, has not an adequate but only a confused and fragmentary knowledge of itself, of its own body, and of external bodies. For the mind does not know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of body (II: 23). It only perceives its own body (II: 19) through the ideas of the modifications, and only perceives external bodies through the same means; thus, in so far as it has such ideas of modification, it has not an adequate knowledge of itself (II: 29), nor of its own body (II: 27), nor of external bodies (II. xxv.), but only a fragmentary and confused knowledge thereof (II: 28 and n). QED.

Prop. 30: We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body.

Prop. 31: We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of particular things external to ourselves.

Corollary: Hence it follows that all particular things are contingent and perishable. For we can have no adequate idea of their duration (by the last Prop.), and this is what we must understand by the contingency and perishableness of things. (I: 33 n1.) For (I: 29), except in this sense, nothing is contingent.

Prop. 32: All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are true.

Prop. 33: There is nothing positive in ideas, which causes them to be called false.

Prop. 34: Every idea, which in us is absolute or adequate and perfect, is true.

Prop. 35: Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, fragmentary, or confused ideas involve.

Note: In the note to II: 17. I explained how error consists in the privation of knowledge, but in order to throw more light on the subject I will give an example. For instance, men are mistaken in thinking themselves free; their opinion is made up of consciousness of their own actions, and ignorance of the causes by which they are conditioned. Their idea of freedom, therefore, is simply their ignorance of any cause for their actions. As for their saying that human actions depend on the will, this is a mere phrase without any idea to correspond thereto. What the will is, and how it moves the body, they none of them know; those who boast of such knowledge, and feign dwellings and habitations for the soul, are wont to provoke either laughter or disgust. So, again, when we look at the sun, we imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet; this error does not lie solely in this fancy, but in the fact that, while we thus imagine, we do not know the sun's true distance or the cause of the fancy. For although we afterwards learn, that the sun is distant from us more than six hundred of the earth's diameters, we none the less shall fancy it to be near; for we do not imagine the sun as near us, because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the modification of our body involves the essence of the sun, in so far as our said body is affected thereby.

Prop. 36: Inadequate or confused ideas follow by the same necessity, as adequate or clear and distinct ideas.

Prop. 37: That which is common to all, and is equally in a part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any particular thing.

Prop. 38: Those things, which are common to all, and are equally in a part and in the whole, cannot be conceived except adequately.

Corollary: Hence it follows that there are certain ideas or notions common to all men; for (by Lemma 2.) all bodies agree in certain respects, which (by the foregoing Prop.) must be adequately or clearly and distinctly perceived by all.

Prop. 39: That, which is common to and a property of the human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the human body, and which is present equally in each part of either or in the whole, will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind.

Prop. 40: Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas, which are therein adequate, are also themselves adequate.

Note 1: I have thus set forth the cause of those notions, which are common to all men, and which form the basis of our ratiocination. But there are other causes of certain axioms or notions, which it would be to the purpose to set forth by this method of ours; for it would thus appear what notions are more useful than others, and what notions have scarcely any use at all. Furthermore, we should see what notions are common to all men, and what notions are only clear and distinct to those who are unshackled by prejudice, and we should detect those

which are ill-founded. Again we should discern whence the notions called *secondary* derived their origin, and consequently the axioms on which they are founded and other points of interest connected with these questions. But I have decided to pass over the subject here, partly because I have set it aside for another treatise, partly because I am afraid of wearying the reader by too great prolixity. Nevertheless, in order not to omit anything necessary to be known, I will briefly set down the causes, whence are derived the terms styled *transcendental*, such as Being, Thing, Something. These terms arose from the fact, that the human body, being limited, is only capable of distinctly forming a certain number of images (what an image is I explained in II: 17 n) within itself at the same time; if this number be exceeded, the images will begin to be confused; if this number of images, which the body is capable of forming distinctly within itself, be largely exceeded, all will become entirely confused one with another. This being so, it is evident (from II: 17 c, 18) that the human mind can distinctly imagine as many things simultaneously, as its body can form images simultaneously. When the images become quite confused in the body, the mind also imagines all bodies confusedly without any distinction, and will comprehend them, as it were, under one attribute, namely, under the attribute of Being, Thing, c. The same conclusion can be drawn from the fact that images are not always equally vivid, and from other analogous causes, which there is no need to explain here; for the purpose which we have in view it is sufficient for us to consider one only. All may be reduced to this, that these terms represent ideas in the highest degree confused. From similar causes arise those notions, which we call *general*, such as man, horse, dog, c. They arise, to wit, from the fact that so many images, for instance, of men, are formed simultaneously in the human mind, that the powers of imagination break down, not indeed utterly, but to the extent of the mind losing count of small differences between individuals (*e.g.* color, size, c.) and their definite number, and only distinctly imagining that, in which all the individuals, in so far as the body is affected by them, agree; for that is the point, in which each of the said individuals chiefly affected the body; this the mind expresses by the name man, and this it predicates of an infinite number of particular individuals. For, as we have said, it is unable to imagine the definite number of individuals. We must, however, bear in mind, that these general notions are not formed by all men in the same way, but vary in each individual according as the point varies, whereby the body has been most often affected and which the mind most easily imagines or remembers. For instance, those who have most often regarded with admiration the stature of man, will by the name of man understand an animal of erect stature; those who have been accustomed to regard some other attribute, will form a different general image of man, for instance, that man is a laughing animal, a two-footed animal without feathers, a rational animal, and thus, in other cases, everyone will form general images of things according to the habit of his body.

It is thus not to be wondered at, that among philosophers, who seek to explain things in nature merely by the images formed of them, so many controversies should have arisen.

Note 2: From all that has been said above it is clear, that we, in many cases, perceive and form our general notions: (1) From particular things represented to our intellect fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses (II: 29 c); I have settled to call such perceptions by the name of knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience. (2) From symbols, *e.g.*, from the fact of having read or heard certain words we remember things and form certain ideas concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things (II: 18

n). I shall call both these ways of regarding things *knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination*. (3) From the fact that we have notions common to all men, and adequate ideas of the properties of things (II: 38 c, 39 and c, 40); this I call *reason* and *knowledge of the second kind*. Besides these two kinds of knowledge, there is, as I will hereafter show, a third kind of knowledge, which we will call intuition. This kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. I will illustrate all three kinds of knowledge by a single example. Three numbers are given for finding a fourth, which shall be to the third as the second is to the first. Tradesmen without hesitation multiply the second by the third, and divide the product by the first; either because they have not forgotten the rule which they received from a master without any proof, or because they have often made trial of it with simple numbers, or by virtue of the proof of the nineteenth proposition of the seventh book of Euclid, namely, in virtue of the general property of proportionals.

But with very simple numbers there is no need of this. For instance, one, two, three, being given, everyone can see that the fourth proportional is six; and this is much clearer, because we infer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the ratio, which the first bears to the second.

Prop. 41: Opinion is the only source of falsity; reason and intuition are necessarily true.

Prop. 42: Reason and intuition, not opinion, teach us to distinguish the true from the false.

Prop. 43: He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing perceived.

Note: I explained in II: 21 n what is meant by the idea of an idea; but we may remark that the foregoing proposition is in itself sufficiently plain. No one, who has a true idea, is ignorant that a true idea involves the highest certainty. For to have a true idea is only another expression for knowing a thing perfectly, or as well as possible. No one, indeed, can doubt of this, unless he thinks that an idea is something lifeless, like a picture on a panel, and not a mode of thinking—namely, the very act of understanding. And who, I ask, can know that he understands anything, unless he do first understand it? In other words, who can know that he is sure of a thing, unless he be first sure of that thing? Further, what can there be more clear, and more certain, than a true idea as a standard of truth? Even as light displays both itself and darkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity.

I think I have thus sufficiently answered these questions—namely, if a true idea is distinguished from a false idea, only in so far as it is said to agree with its object, a true idea has no more reality or perfection than a false idea (since the two are only distinguished by an extrinsic mark); consequently, neither will a man who has true ideas have any advantage over him who has only false ideas. Further, how comes it that men have false ideas? Lastly, how can anyone be sure, that he has ideas which agree with their objects? These questions, I repeat, I have, in my opinion, sufficiently answered. The difference between a true idea and a false idea is plain: from what was said in II: 35, the former is related to the latter as being is to not-being. The causes of falsity I have set forth very clearly in II: 19, 35 n. From what is there stated, the difference between a man who has true ideas, and a man who has only false

ideas, is made apparent. As for the last question—as to how a man can be sure that he has ideas that agree with their objects, I have just pointed out, with abundant clearness, that his knowledge arises from the simple fact, that he has an idea which corresponds with its object—in other words, that truth is its own standard. We may add that our mind, in so far as it perceives things truly, is part of the infinite intellect of God (II: 11 c); therefore, the clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as necessarily true as the ideas of God.

Prop. 44: It is not in the nature of reason to regard things as contingent, but as necessary.

Note: How this way of looking at things arises, I will briefly explain. We have shown above (II: 17 and c) that the mind always regards things as present to itself, even though they be not in existence, until some causes arise which exclude their existence and presence. Further (II: 18), we showed that, if the human body has once been affected by two external bodies simultaneously, the mind, when it afterwards imagines one of the said external bodies, will straightway remember the other—that is, it will regard both as present to itself, unless there arise causes which exclude their existence and presence. Further, no one doubts that we imagine time, from the fact that we imagine bodies to be moved some more slowly than others, some more quickly, some at equal speed. Thus, let us suppose that a child yesterday saw Peter for the first time in the morning, Paul at noon, and Simon in the evening; then, that to-day he again sees Peter in the morning. It is evident, from II: 18, that, as soon as he sees the morning light, he will imagine that the sun will traverse the same parts of the sky, as it did when he saw it on the preceding day; in other words, he will imagine a complete day, and, together with his imagination of the morning, he will imagine Peter; with noon, he will imagine Paul; and with evening, he will imagine Simon—that is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simon in relation to a future time; on the other hand, if he sees Simon in the evening, he will refer Peter and Paul to a past time, by imagining them simultaneously with the imagination of a past time. If it should at any time happen, that on some other evening the child should see James instead of Simon, he will, on the following morning, associate with his imagination of evening sometimes Simon, sometimes James, not both together: for the child is supposed to have seen, at evening, one or other of them, not both together. His imagination will therefore waver; and, with the imagination of future evenings, he will associate first one, then the other—that is, he will imagine them in the future, neither of them as certain, but both as contingent. This wavering of the imagination will be the same, if the imagination be concerned with things which we thus contemplate, standing in relation to time past or time present: consequently, we may imagine things as contingent, whether they be referred to time present, past, or future.

Corollary 2: It is in the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain form of eternity (*sub quâdam æternitatis specie*).

Prop. 45: Every idea of every body, or of every particular thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God.

Note: By existence I do not here mean duration—that is, existence in so far as it is conceived abstractedly, and as a certain form of quantity. I am speaking of the very nature of existence, which is assigned to particular things, because they follow in infinite numbers and in infinite ways from the eternal necessity of God's nature (I: 16). I am speaking, I repeat, of

the very existence of particular things, in so far as they are in God. For although each particular thing be conditioned by another particular thing to exist in a given way, yet the force whereby each particular thing perseveres in existing follows from the eternal necessity of God's nature (cf. I: 24 c).

Prop. 46: The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God, which every idea involves, is adequate and perfect.

Prop. 47: The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God.

Note: Hence we see that the infinite essence and the eternity of God are known to all. Now as all things are in God, and are conceived through God, we can from this knowledge infer many things, which we may adequately know, and we may form that third kind of knowledge of which we spoke in II: 40 n, and of the excellence and use of which we shall have occasion to speak in Part V. Men have not so clear a knowledge of God as they have of general notions, because they are unable to imagine God as they do bodies, and also because they have associated the name God with images of things that they are in the habit of seeing, as indeed they can hardly avoid doing, being, as they are, men, and continually affected by external bodies. Many errors, in truth, can be traced to this head, namely, that we do not apply names to things rightly. For instance, when a man says that the lines drawn from the center of a circle to its circumference are not equal, he then, at all events, assuredly attaches a meaning to the word circle different from that assigned by mathematicians. So again, when men make mistakes in calculation, they have one set of figures in their mind, and another on the paper. If we could see into their minds, they do not make a mistake; they seem to do so, because we think, that they have the same numbers in their mind as they have on the paper. If this were not so, we should not believe them to be in error, any more than I thought that a man was in error, whom I lately heard exclaiming that his entrance hall had flown into a neighbor's hen, for his meaning seemed to me sufficiently clear. Very many controversies have arisen from the fact, that men do not rightly explain their meaning, or do not rightly interpret the meaning of others. For, as a matter of fact, as they flatly contradict themselves, they assume now one side, now another, of the argument, so as to oppose the opinions, which they consider mistaken and absurd in their opponents.

Prop. 48: In the mind there is no absolute or free will; but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which has also been determined by another cause, and this last by another cause, and so on to infinity.

Prop. 49: There is in the mind no volition, or affirmation and negation, save that which an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves.

Note: We have thus removed the cause which is commonly assigned for error. For we have shown above, that falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideas which are fragmentary and confused. Wherefore, a false idea, inasmuch as it is false, does not involve certainty. When we say, then, that a man acquiesces in what is false, and that he has no doubts on the subject, we do not say that he is certain, but only that he does not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is false, inasmuch as there are no reasons, which should cause

his imagination to waver (see II: 44 n). Thus, although the man be assumed to acquiesce in what is false, we shall never say that he is certain. For by certainty we mean something positive (II: 43 and n), not merely the absence of doubt.

However, in order that the foregoing proposition may be fully explained, I will draw attention to a few additional points, and I will furthermore answer the objections which may be advanced against our doctrine. Lastly, in order to remove every scruple, I have thought it worthwhile to point out some of the advantages, which follow therefrom. I say “some,” for they will be better appreciated from what we shall set forth in the fifth part.

I begin, then, with the first point, and warn my readers to make an accurate distinction between an idea, or conception of the mind, and the images of things which we imagine. It is further necessary that they should distinguish between idea and words, whereby we signify things. These three—namely, images, words, and ideas—are by many persons either entirely confused together, or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care, and hence people are generally in ignorance, how absolutely necessary is a knowledge of this doctrine of the will, both for philosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life. Those who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by contact with external bodies, persuade themselves that the ideas of those things, whereof we can form no mental picture, are not ideas, but only figments, which we invent by the free decree of our will; they thus regard ideas as though they were inanimate pictures on a panel, and, filled with this misconception, do not see that an idea, inasmuch as it is an idea, involves an affirmation or negation. Again, those who confuse words with ideas, or with the affirmation which an idea involves, think that they can wish something contrary to what they feel, affirm, or deny. This misconception will easily be laid aside by one, who reflects on the nature of knowledge, and seeing that it in no wise involves the conception of extension, will therefore clearly understand, that an idea (being a mode of thinking) does not consist in the image of anything, nor in words. The essence of words and images is put together by bodily motions, which in no wise involve the conception of thought.

These few words on this subject will suffice: I will therefore pass on to consider the objections, which may be raised against our doctrine. Of these, the first is advanced by those, who think that the will has a wider scope than the understanding, and that therefore it is different therefrom. The reason for their holding the belief, that the will has wider scope than the understanding, is that they assert, that they have no need of an increase in their faculty of assent, that is of affirmation or negation, in order to assent to an infinity of things which we do not perceive, but that they have need of an increase in their faculty of understanding. The will is thus distinguished from the intellect, the latter being finite and the former infinite. Secondly, it may be objected that experience seems to teach us especially clearly, that we are able to suspend our judgment before assenting to things which we perceive; this is confirmed by the fact that no one is said to be deceived, in so far as he perceives anything, but only in so far as he assents or dissents.

For instance, he who feigns a winged horse does not therefore admit that a winged horse exists; that is, he is not deceived, unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does exist. Nothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly by experience, than that the will or faculty

of assent is free and different from the faculty of understanding. Thirdly, it may be objected that one affirmation does not apparently contain more reality than another; in other words, that we do not seem to need for affirming, that what is true is true, any greater power than for affirming, that what is false is true. We have, however, seen that one idea has more reality or perfection than another, for as objects are some more excellent than others, so also are the ideas of them some more excellent than others; this also seems to point to a difference between the understanding and the will. Fourthly, it may be objected, if man does not act from free will, what will happen if the incentives to action are equally balanced, as in the case of Buridan's ass? Will he perish of hunger and thirst? If I say that he would, I shall seem to have in my thoughts an ass or the statue of a man rather than an actual man. If I say that he would not, he would then determine his own action, and would consequently possess the faculty of going and doing whatever he liked. Other objections might also be raised, but, as I am not bound to put in evidence everything that anyone may dream, I will only set myself to the task of refuting those I have mentioned, and that as briefly as possible.

To the *first* objection I answer, that I admit that the will has a wider scope than the understanding, if by the understanding be meant only clear and distinct ideas; but I deny that the will has a wider scope than the perceptions, and the faculty of forming conceptions; nor do I see why the faculty of volition should be called infinite, any more than the faculty of feeling: for, as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an infinite number of things (one after the other, for we cannot affirm an infinite number simultaneously), so also can we, by the same faculty of feeling, feel or perceive (in succession) an infinite number of bodies. If it be said that there is an infinite number of things which we cannot perceive, I answer, that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking, nor, consequently, by any faculty of volition. But, it may still be urged, if God wished to bring it about that we should perceive them, he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of perception, but not a greater faculty of volition than we have already. This is the same as to say that, if God wished to bring it about that we should understand an infinite number of other entities, it would be necessary for him to give us a greater understanding, but not a more universal idea of entity than that which we have already, in order to grasp such infinite entities. We have shown that will is a universal entity or idea, whereby we explain all particular volitions—in other words, that which is common to all such volitions.

As, then, our opponents maintain that this idea, common or universal to all volitions, is a faculty, it is little to be wondered at that they assert, that such a faculty extends itself into the infinite, beyond the limits of the understanding: for what is universal is predicated alike of one, of many, and of an infinite number of individuals.

To the *second* objection I reply by denying, that we have a free power of suspending our judgment: for, when we say that anyone suspends his judgment, we merely mean that he sees, that he does not perceive the matter in question adequately. Suspension of judgment is, therefore, strictly speaking, a perception, and not free will. In order to illustrate the point, let us suppose a boy imagining a horse, and perceiving nothing else. Inasmuch as this imagination involves the existence of the horse (II: 17 c), and the boy does not perceive anything which would exclude the existence of the horse, he will necessarily regard the horse as present: he will not be able to doubt of its existence, although he be not certain thereof.

We have daily experience of such a state of things in dreams; and I do not suppose that there is anyone, who would maintain that, while he is dreaming, he has the free power of suspending his judgment concerning the things in his dream, and bringing it about that he should not dream those things, which he dreams that he sees; yet it happens, notwithstanding, that even in dreams we suspend our judgment, namely, when we dream that we are dreaming.

Further, I grant that no one can be deceived, so far as actual perception extends—that is, I grant that the mind’s imaginations, regarded in themselves, do not involve error (II: 17 n); but I deny, that a man does not, in the act of perception, make any affirmation. For what is the perception of a winged horse, save affirming that a horse has wings? If the mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse, it would regard the same as present to itself: it would have no reasons for doubting its existence, nor any faculty of dissent, unless the imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which precludes the existence of the said horse, or unless the mind perceives that the idea which it possesses of a winged horse is inadequate, in which case it will either necessarily deny the existence of such a horse, or will necessarily be in doubt on the subject.

I think that I have anticipated my answer to the *third* objection, namely, that the will is something universal which is predicated of all ideas, and that it only signifies that which is common to all ideas, namely, an affirmation, whose adequate essence must, therefore, in so far as it is thus conceived in the abstract, be in every idea, and be, in this respect alone, the same in all, not in so far as it is considered as constituting the idea’s essence: for, in this respect, particular affirmations differ one from the other, as much as do ideas. For instance, the affirmation which involves the idea of a circle, differs from that which involves the idea of a triangle, as much as the idea of a circle differs from the idea of a triangle.

Further, I absolutely deny, that we are in need of an equal power of thinking, to affirm that that which is true is true, and to affirm that that which is false is true. These two affirmations, if we regard the mind, are in the same relation to one another as being and not-being; for there is nothing positive in ideas, which constitutes the actual reality of falsehood (II: 35n, 47 n).

We must therefore conclude, that we are easily deceived, when we confuse universals with singulars, and the entities of reason and abstractions with realities. As for the *fourth* objection, I am quite ready to admit, that a man placed in the equilibrium described (namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst, a certain food and a certain drink, each equally distant from him) would die of hunger and thirst. If I am asked, whether such an one should not rather be considered an ass than a man; I answer, that I do not know, neither do I know how a man should be considered, who hangs himself, or how we should consider children, fools, madmen, c.

It remains to point out the advantages of a knowledge of this doctrine as bearing on conduct, and this may be easily gathered from what has been said. The doctrine is good,

1. Inasmuch as it teaches us to act solely according to the decree of God, and to be partakers in the Divine nature, and so much the more, as we perform more perfect actions and more

and more understand God. Such a doctrine not only completely tranquillizes our spirit, but also shows us where our highest happiness or blessedness is, namely, solely in the knowledge of God, whereby we are led to act only as love and piety shall bid us. We may thus clearly understand, how far astray from a true estimate of virtue are those who expect to be decorated by God with high rewards for their virtue, and their best actions, as for having endured the direst slavery; as if virtue and the service of God were not in itself happiness and perfect freedom.

2. Inasmuch as it teaches us, how we ought to conduct ourselves with respect to the gifts of fortune, or matters which are not in our own power, and do not follow from our nature. For it shows us, that we should await and endure fortune's smiles or frowns with an equal mind, seeing that all things follow from the eternal decree of God by the same necessity, as it follows from the essence of a triangle, that the three angles are equal to two right angles.

3. This doctrine raises social life, inasmuch as it teaches us to hate no man, neither to despise, to deride, to envy, or to be angry with any. Further, as it tells us that each should be content with his own, and helpful to his neighbor, not from any womanish pity, favor, or superstition, but solely by the guidance of reason, according as the time and occasion demand, as I will show in Part III.

4. Lastly, this doctrine confers no small advantage on the commonwealth; for it teaches how citizens should be governed and led, not so as to become slaves, but so that they may freely do whatsoever things are best.

I have thus fulfilled the promise made at the beginning of this note, and I thus bring the second part of my treatise to a close. I think I have therein explained the nature and properties of the human mind at sufficient length, and, considering the difficulty of the subject, with sufficient clearness. I have laid a foundation, whereon may be raised many excellent conclusions of the highest utility and most necessary to be known, as will, in what follows, be partly made plain.

Part III: On the Origin and Nature of the Emotions

Definitions

1. By an *adequate* cause, I mean a cause through which its effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived. By an *inadequate* or partial cause, I mean a cause through which, by itself, its effect cannot be understood.
2. I say that we *act* when anything takes place, either within us or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate cause; that is (by the foregoing definition) when through our nature something takes place within us or externally to us, which can through our nature alone be clearly and distinctly understood. On the other hand, I say that we are passive as regards something when that something takes place within us, or follows from our nature externally, we being only the partial cause.
3. By *emotion* I mean the modifications of the body, whereby the active power of the said body is increased or diminished, aided or constrained, and also the ideas of such modifications.

NB. If we can be the adequate cause of any of these modifications, I then call the emotion an activity; otherwise I call it a passion, or state wherein the mind is passive.

Propositions

Prop. 1: Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain cases passive. In so far as it has adequate ideas, it is necessarily active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily passive.

Prop. 2: Body cannot determine mind to think, neither can mind determine body to motion or rest, or any state different from these, if such there be.

Prop. 3: The activities of the mind arise solely from adequate ideas; the passive states of the mind depend solely on inadequate ideas.

Note: Thus we see, that passive states are not attributed to the mind, except in so far as it contains something involving negation, or in so far as it is regarded as a part of nature, which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived through itself without other parts: I could thus show, that passive states are attributed to individual things in the same way that they are attributed to the mind, and that they cannot otherwise be perceived, but my purpose is solely to treat of the human mind.

Prop. 4: Nothing can be destroyed, except by a cause external to itself.

Prop. 5: Things are naturally contrary, that is, cannot exist in the same object, in so far as one is capable of destroying the other.

Prop. 6: Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being.

Prop. 7: The endeavor, wherewith everything endeavors to persist in its own being is nothing else but the actual essence of the thing in question.

Prop. 8: The endeavor, whereby a thing endeavors to persist in its being, involves no infinite time, but an indefinite time.

Prop. 9: The mind, both in so far as it has clear and distinct ideas, and also in so far as it has confused ideas, endeavors to persist in its being for an indefinite period, and of this endeavor it is conscious.

Note: This endeavor, when referred solely to the mind, is called *will*, when referred to the mind and body in conjunction it is called *appetite*; it is, in fact, nothing else but man's essence, from the nature of which necessarily follow all those results which tend to its preservation; and which man has thus been determined to perform.

Further, between appetite and desire there is no difference, except that the term desire is generally applied to men, in so far as they are conscious of their appetite, and may accordingly be thus defined: *Desire is appetite with consciousness thereof*. It is thus plain from what has been said, that in no case do we strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we deem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be good, because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or desire it.

Prop. 10: An idea, which excludes the existence of our body cannot be postulated in our mind, but is contrary thereto.

Prop. 11: Whatsoever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of activity in our body, the idea thereof increases or diminishes, helps or hinders the power of thought in our mind.

Note: Thus we see, that the mind can undergo many changes, and can pass sometimes to a state of greater perfection, sometimes to a state of lesser perfection. These passive states of transition explain to us the emotions of pleasure and pain. By *pleasure* therefore in the following propositions I shall signify *a passive state wherein the mind passes to a greater perfection*. By *pain* I shall signify *a passive state wherein the mind passes to a lesser perfection*. Further, the emotion of pleasure in reference to the body and mind together I shall call *stimulation (titillatio)* or *merriment (hilaritas)*, the emotion of pain in the same relation I shall call *suffering* or *melancholy*. But we must bear in mind, that stimulation and suffering are attributed to man, when one part of his nature is more affected than the rest, merriment and melancholy, when all parts are alike affected. What I mean by desire I have explained in III: 9 n of this part; beyond these three I recognize no other primary emotion; I will show as I proceed, that all other emotions arise from these three. But, before I go further, I should like here to explain at greater length III: 10 of this part, in order that we may clearly understand how one idea is contrary to another. In II: 17 n. we showed that the idea, which constitutes the essence of mind, involves the existence of body, so long as the body itself exists. Again, it follows from what we pointed out in II: 8 c, that the present existence of our mind depends solely on the fact, that the mind involves the actual existence of the body. Lastly, we showed (II: 7, 8 and n) that the power of the mind, whereby it imagines and remembers things, also

depends on the fact, that it involves the actual existence of the body. Whence it follows, that the present existence of the mind and its power of imagining are removed, as soon as the mind ceases to affirm the present existence of the body. Now the cause, why the mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body, cannot be the mind itself (III: 4), nor again the fact that the body ceases to exist. For (by II: 6) the cause, why the mind affirms the existence of the body, is not that the body began to exist; therefore, for the same reason, it does not cease to affirm the existence of the body, because the body ceases to exist; but (II: 17) this result follows from another idea, which excludes the present existence of our body and, consequently, of our mind, and which is therefore contrary to the idea constituting the essence of our mind.

Prop. 12: The mind, as far as it can, endeavors to conceive those things, which increase or help the power of activity in the body.

Prop. 13: When the mind conceives things which diminish or hinder the body's power of activity, it endeavors, as far as possible, to remember things, which exclude the existence of the first-named things.

Corollary: Hence it follows, that the mind shrinks from conceiving those things, which diminish or constrain the power of itself and of the body.

Note: From what has been said we may clearly understand the nature of Love and Hate. *Love* is nothing else but *pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause*; *Hate* is nothing else but *pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause*. We further see that he who loves necessarily endeavors to have, and to keep present to him, the object of his love; while he who hates endeavors to remove and destroy the object of his hatred. But I will treat of these matters at more length hereafter.

Prop. 14: If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one of the two, be also affected by the other.

Prop. 15: Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure, pain, or desire.

Corollary: Simply from the fact that we have regarded a thing with the emotion of pleasure or pain, though that thing be not the efficient cause of the emotion, we can either love or hate it.

Note: Hence we understand how it may happen, that we love or hate a thing without any cause for our emotion being known to us; merely, as the phrase is, from *sympathy* or *antipathy*. We should refer to the same category those objects, which affect us pleurably or painfully, simply because they resemble other objects which affect us in the same way. This I will show in the next Prop. I am aware that certain authors, who were the first to introduce these terms "sympathy" and "antipathy," wished to signify thereby some occult qualities in things; nevertheless I think we may be permitted to use the same terms to indicate known or manifest qualities.

Prop. 16: Simply from the fact that we conceive, that a given object has some point of resemblance with another object, which is wont to affect the mind pleasurable or painfully, although the point of resemblance be not the efficient cause of the said emotions, we shall still regard the first-named object with love or hate.

Prop. 17: If we conceive that a thing, which is wont to affect us painfully, has any point of resemblance with another thing, which is wont to affect us with an equally strong emotion of pleasure, we shall hate the first-named thing, and at the same time we shall love it.

Prop. 18: A man is as much affected pleasurable or painfully by the image of a thing past or future, as by the image of a thing present.

Note 1: I call a thing past or future, according as we either have been or shall be affected thereby. For instance, according as we have seen it, or are about to see it, according as it has recreated us, or will recreate us, according as it has harmed us, or will harm us. For, as we thus conceive it, we affirm its existence; that is, the body is affected by no emotion which excludes the existence of the thing, and therefore (II: 17) the body is affected by the image of the thing, in the same way as if the thing were actually present. However, as it generally happens that those, who have had many experiences, vacillate, so long as they regard a thing as future or past, and are usually in doubt about its issue (II: 44 n); it follows that the emotions which arise from similar images of things are not so constant, but are generally disturbed by the images of other things, until men become assured of the issue.

Note 2: From what has just been said, we understand what is meant by the terms Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, Joy, and Disappointment. *Hope* is nothing else but *an inconstant pleasure, arising from the image of something future or past, whereof we do not yet know the issue*. *Fear*, on the other hand, is *an inconstant pain also arising from the image of something concerning which we are in doubt*. If the element of doubt be removed from these emotions, hope becomes *Confidence* and fear becomes *Despair*. In other words, *Pleasure or Pain arising from the image of something concerning which we have hoped or feared*. Again, *Joy* is *Pleasure arising from the image of something past whereof we doubted the issue*. *Disappointment* is the *Pain opposed to Joy*.

Prop. 19: He, who conceives that the object of his love is destroyed, will feel pain; if he conceives that it is preserved, he will feel pleasure.

Prop. 20: He who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed, will feel pleasure.

Prop. 21: He who conceives that the object of his love is affected pleasurable or painfully, will himself be affected pleasurable or painfully; and the one or the other emotion will be greater or less in the lover, according as it is greater or less in the thing loved.

Prop. 22: If we conceive that anything pleasurable affects some object of our love, we shall be affected with love towards that thing. Contrariwise, if we conceive that it affects an object of our love painfully, we shall be affected with hatred towards it.

Note: III: 21 explains to us the nature of *Pity*, which we may define as *pain arising from another's hurt*. What term we can use for pleasure arising from another's gain, I know not.

We will call the *love towards him who confers a benefit on another*, *Approval*; and the *hatred towards him who injures another*, we will call *Indignation*. We must further remark, that we not only feel pity for a thing which we have loved (as shown in III: 21), but also for a thing which we have hitherto regarded without emotion, provided that we deem that it resembles ourselves (as I will show presently). Thus, we bestow approval on one who has benefited anything resembling ourselves, and, contrariwise, are indignant with him who has done it an injury.

Prop. 23: He who conceives that an object of his hatred is painfully affected, will feel pleasure. Contrariwise, if he thinks that the said object is pleasurable affected, he will feel pain. Each of these emotions will be greater or less, according as its contrary is greater or less in the object of hatred.

Prop. 24: If we conceive that any one pleasurable affects an object of our hate, we shall feel hatred towards him also. If we conceive that he painfully affects the said object, we shall feel love towards him.

Note: These and similar emotions of hatred are attributable to *envy*, which, accordingly, is nothing else but *hatred, in so far as it is regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in another's hurt, and to grieve at another's advantage*.

Prop. 25: We endeavor to affirm, concerning ourselves and concerning what we love, everything that we conceive to affect pleasurable ourselves or the loved object. Contrariwise, we endeavor to negate everything, which we conceive to affect painfully ourselves or the loved object.

Prop. 26: We endeavor to affirm, concerning that which we hate, everything which we conceive to affect it painfully; and contrariwise, we endeavor to deny concerning it everything which we conceive to affect it pleasurable.

Note: Thus we see that it may readily happen, that a man may easily think too highly of himself, or a loved object, and, contrariwise, too meanly of a hated object. This feeling is called *pride*, in reference to the man who thinks too highly of himself, and is a species of madness, wherein a man dreams with his eyes open, thinking that he can accomplish all things that fall within the scope of his conception, and thereupon accounting them real, and exulting in them, so long as he is unable to conceive anything which excludes their existence, and determines his own power of action. *Pride*, therefore, is *pleasure springing from a man thinking too highly of himself*. Again, the *pleasure which arises from a man thinking too highly of another* is called *over-esteem*. Whereas the *pleasure which arises from thinking too little of a man* is called *disdain*.

Prop. 27: By the very fact that we conceive a thing, which is like ourselves, and which we have not regarded with any emotion, to be affected with any emotion, we are ourselves affected with a like emotion.

Note 1: This imitation of emotions, when it is referred to pain, is called *compassion* (cf. III: 22 n); when it is referred to desire, it is called *emulation*, which is nothing else but *the desire of anything, engendered in us by the fact that we conceive that others have the like desire*.

Corollary 1: If we conceive that anyone, whom we have hitherto regarded with no emotion, pleasurable affects something similar to ourselves, we shall be affected with love towards him. If, on the other hand, we conceive that he painfully affects the same, we shall be affected with hatred towards him.

Prop. 28: We endeavor to bring about whatsoever we conceive to conduce to pleasure; but we endeavor to remove or destroy whatsoever we conceive to be truly repugnant thereto, or to conduce to pain.

Note: This endeavor to do a thing or leave it undone, solely in order to please men, we call *ambition*, especially when we so eagerly endeavor to please the vulgar, that we do or omit certain things to our own or another's hurt: in other cases it is generally called *kindliness*. Furthermore I give the name of *praise* to the *pleasure, with which we conceive the action of another, whereby he has endeavored to please us*; but of *blame* to the *pain wherewith we feel aversion to his action*.

Prop. 29: We shall also endeavor to do whatsoever we conceive men to regard with pleasure, and contrariwise we shall shrink from doing that which we conceive men to shrink from.

Note: This endeavor to do a thing or leave it undone, solely in order to please men, we call *ambition*, especially when we so eagerly endeavor to please the vulgar, that we do or omit certain things to our own or another's hurt: in other cases it is generally called *kindliness*. Furthermore I give the name of *praise* to the *pleasure, with which we conceive the action of another, whereby he has endeavored to please us*; but of *blame* to the *pain wherewith we feel aversion to his action*.

Prop. 30: If anyone has done something which he conceives as affecting other men pleasurable, he will be affected by pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself as a cause; in other words, he will regard himself with pleasure. On the other hand, if he has done anything which regards as affecting others painfully, he will regard himself with pain.

Note: As love (III: 13) is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause, and hatred is pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause; the pleasure and pain in question will be a species of love and hatred. But, as the terms love and hatred are used in reference to external objects, we will employ other names for the emotions now under discussion: pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause we will style *Honor*, and the emotion contrary thereto we will style *Shame*: I mean in such cases as where pleasure or pain arises from a man's belief, that he is being praised or blamed: otherwise pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause is called *self-complacency*, and its contrary pain is called *repentance*. Again, as it may happen (II: 17 c) that the pleasure, wherewith a man conceives that he affects others, may exist solely in his own imagination, and as (III: 25) everyone

endeavors to conceive concerning himself that which he conceives will affect him with pleasure, it may easily come to pass that a vain man may be proud and may imagine that he is pleasing to all, when in reality he may be an annoyance to all.

Prop. 31: If we conceive that anyone loves, desires, or hates anything which we love, desire, or hate, we shall thereupon regard the thing in question with more steadfast love, etc. On the contrary, if we think, that anyone shrinks from something that we love, we shall undergo vacillation of soul.

Corollary: From the foregoing, and also from III: 28. it follows that everyone endeavors, as far as possible, to cause others to love what he himself loves, and to hate what he himself hates: as the poet says: “As lovers let us share every hope and every fear: iron hearted were he who should love what the other leaves.”

Note: This endeavor to bring it about, that our own likes and dislikes should meet with universal approval, is really ambition (see III: 29 n); wherefore we see that everyone by nature desires (*appetere*), that the rest of mankind should live according to his own individual disposition: when such a desire is equally present in all, everyone stands in everyone else’s way, and in wishing to be loved or praised by all, all become mutually hateful.

Prop. 32: If we conceive that anyone takes delight in something, which only one person can possess, we shall endeavor to bring it about, that the man in question shall not gain possession thereof.

Note: We thus see that man’s nature is generally so constituted, that he takes pity on those who fare ill, and envies those who fare well with an amount of hatred proportioned to his own love for the goods in their possession. Further, we see that from the same property of human nature, whence it follows that men are merciful, it follows also that they are envious and ambitious. Lastly, if we make appeal to Experience, we shall find that she entirely confirms what we have said; more especially if we turn our attention to the first years of our life. We find that children, whose body is continually, as it were, in equilibrium, laugh or cry simply because they see others laughing or crying; moreover, they desire forthwith to imitate whatever they see others doing, and to possess themselves whatever they conceive as delighting others: inasmuch as the images of things are, as we have said, modifications of the human body, or modes wherein the human body is affected and disposed by external causes to act in this or that manner.

Prop. 33: When we love a thing similar to ourselves, we endeavor, as far as we can, to bring it about, that it should love us in return.

Prop. 34: The greater the emotion with which we conceive a loved object to be affected towards us, the greater will be our complacency.

Prop. 35: If anyone conceives, that an object of his love joins itself to another with closer bonds of friendship than he himself has attained to, he will be affected with hatred towards the loved object and with envy towards his rival.

Note: This hatred towards an object of love joined with envy is called *Jealousy*, which accordingly is nothing else but a wavering of the disposition arising from combined love and hatred, accompanied by the idea of some rival who is envied. Further, this hatred towards the object of love will be greater, in proportion to the pleasure which the jealous man had been wont to derive from the reciprocated love of the said object; and also in proportion to the feelings he had previously entertained towards his rival. If he had hated him, he will forthwith hate the object of his love, because he conceives it is pleasurable affected by one whom he himself hates: and also because he is compelled to associate the image of his loved one with the image of him whom he hates. This condition generally comes into play in the case of love for a woman: for he who thinks, that a woman whom he loves prostitutes herself to another, will feel pain, not only because his own desire is restrained, but also because, being compelled to associate the image of her he loves with the parts of shame and the excreta of another, he therefore shrinks from her.

We must add, that a jealous man is not greeted by his beloved with the same joyful countenance as before, and this also gives him pain as a lover, as I will now show.

Prop. 36: He who remembers a thing, in which he has once taken delight, desires to possess it under the same circumstances as when he first took delight therein.

Prop. 37: Desire arising through pain or pleasure, hatred or love, is greater in proportion as the emotion is greater.

Prop. 38: If a man has begun to hate an object of his love, so that love is thoroughly destroyed, he will, causes being equal, regard it with more hatred than if he had never loved it, and his hatred will be in proportion to the strength of his former love.

Prop. 39: He who hates anyone will endeavor to do him an injury, unless he fears that a greater injury will thereby accrue to himself; on the other hand, he who loves anyone will, by the same law, seek to benefit him.

Note: By *good* I here mean every kind of pleasure, and all that conduces thereto, especially that which satisfies our longings, whatsoever they may be. By *evil*, I mean every kind of pain, especially that which frustrates our longings. For I have shown (III: 9 n) that we in no case desire a thing because we deem it good, but, contrariwise, we deem a thing good because we desire it: consequently we deem evil that which we shrink from; everyone, therefore, according to his particular emotions, judges or estimates what is good, what is bad, what is better, what is worse, lastly, what is best, and what is worst. Thus a miser thinks that abundance of money is the best, and want of money the worst; an ambitious man desires nothing so much as glory, and fears nothing so much as shame. To an envious man nothing is more delightful than another's misfortune, and nothing more painful than another's success. So every man, according to his emotions, judges a thing to be good or bad, useful or useless. The emotion, which induces a man to turn from that which he wishes, or to wish for that which he turns from, is called *timidity*, which may accordingly be defined as *the fear whereby a man is induced to avoid an evil which he regards as future by encountering a lesser evil* (III: 28). But if the evil which he fears be shame, timidity becomes *bashfulness*. Lastly, if the desire to avoid a future evil be checked by the fear of another evil, so that the

man knows not which to choose, fear becomes *consternation*, especially if both the evils feared be very great.

Prop. 40: He, who conceives himself to be hated by another, and believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate that other in return.

Note: He who thinks that he has given just cause for hatred will (III: 30 and n) be affected with shame; but this case (III: 25) rarely happens. This reciprocation of hatred may also arise from the hatred, which follows an endeavor to injure the object of our hate (III: 39). He therefore who conceives that he is hated by another will conceive his enemy as the cause of some evil or pain; thus he will be affected with pain or fear, accompanied by the idea of his enemy as cause; in other words, he will be affected with hatred towards his enemy, as I said above.

Corollary 2: If a man conceives that one, whom he has hitherto regarded without emotion, has done him any injury from motives of hatred, he will forthwith seek to repay the injury in kind.

Prop. 41: If anyone conceives that he is loved by another, and believes that he has given no cause for such love, he will love that other in return.

Note: If he believes that he has given just cause for the love, he will take pride therein (III: 30 and n); this is what most often happens (III: 25), and we said that its contrary took place whenever a man conceives himself to be hated by another. (See note to preceding proposition.) This reciprocal love, and consequently the desire of benefiting him who loves us (III: 39), and who endeavors to benefit us, is called *gratitude* or *thankfulness*. It thus appears that men are much more prone to take vengeance than to return benefits.

Prop. 42: He, who has conferred a benefit on anyone from motives of love or honor, will feel pain, if he sees that the benefit is received without gratitude.

Prop. 43: Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can on the other hand be destroyed by love.

Prop. 44: Hatred which is completely vanquished by love passes into love; and love is thereupon greater, than if hatred had not preceded it.

Prop. 45: If a man conceives, that anyone similar to himself hates anything also similar to himself, which he loves, he will hate that person.

Prop. 46: If a man has been affected pleasurably or painfully by anyone of a class or nation different from his own, and if the pleasure or pain has been accompanied by the idea of the said stranger as cause, under the general category of the class or nation: the man will feel love or hatred not only to the individual stranger, but also to the whole class or nation, whereto he belongs.

Prop. 47: Joy arising from the fact, that anything we hate is destroyed or suffers other injury, is never unaccompanied by a certain pain in us.

Prop. 48: Love or hatred towards, for instance, Peter is destroyed, if the pleasure involved in the former, or the pain involved in the latter emotion, be associated with the idea of another cause; and will be diminished in proportion as we conceive Peter not to have been the sole cause of either emotion.

Prop. 49: Love or hatred towards a thing, which we conceive to be free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater, than if it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity.

Prop. 50: Anything whatever can be, accidentally, a cause of hope or fear.

Prop. 51: Different men may be differently affected by the same object, and the same man may be differently affected at different times by the same object.

Note: We thus see that it is possible, that what one man loves another may hate, and that what one man fears another may not fear; or, again, that one and the same man may love what he once hated, or may be bold where he once was timid, and so on. Again, as everyone judges according to his emotions what is good, what bad, what better, and what worse (III: 39 n), it follows that men's judgments may vary no less than their emotions, hence when we compare some with others, we distinguish them solely by the diversity of their emotions, and style some intrepid, others timid, others by some other epithet. For instance, I shall call a man *intrepid*, if he despises an evil which I am accustomed to fear; if I further take into consideration, that, in his desire to injure his enemies and to benefit those whom he loves, he is not restrained by the fear of an evil which is sufficient to restrain me, I shall call him *daring*. Again, a man will appear *timid* to me, if he fears an evil which I am accustomed to despise; and if I further take into consideration that his desire is restrained by the fear of an evil, which is not sufficient to restrain me, I shall say that he is *cowardly*; and in like manner will everyone pass judgment.

Lastly, from this inconstancy in the nature of human judgment, inasmuch as a man often judges of things solely by his emotions, and inasmuch as the things which he believes cause pleasure or pain, and therefore endeavors to promote or prevent, are often purely imaginary, not to speak of the uncertainty of things alluded to in III: 28.; we may readily conceive that a man may be at one time affected with pleasure, and at another with pain, accompanied by the idea of himself as cause. Thus we can easily understand what are *Repentance* and *Self-complacency*, *Repentance is pain, accompanied by the idea of one's self as cause; Self-complacency is pleasure accompanied by the idea of one's self as cause*, and these emotions are most intense because men believe themselves to be free (III: 49).

Prop. 52: An object, which we have formerly seen in conjunction with others, and do not conceive to have any property that is not common to many, will not be regarded by us for so long as an object, which we conceive to have some property peculiar to itself.

Note: This mental modification, or imagination of a particular thing, in so far as it is alone in the mind, is called *Wonder*; but if it be excited by an object of fear, it is called *Consternation*, because wonder at an evil keeps a man so engrossed in the simple contemplation thereof, that he has no power to think of anything else whereby he might avoid the evil. If, however, the object of wonder be a man's prudence, industry, or anything of that

sort, inasmuch as the said man is thereby regarded as far surpassing ourselves, wonder is called *Veneration*; otherwise, if a man's anger, envy, c., be what we wonder at, the emotion is called *Horror*. Again, if it be the prudence, industry, or what not, of a man we love, that we wonder at, our love will on this account be the greater (III: 12), and when joined to wonder or veneration is called *Devotion*. We may in like manner conceive hatred, hope, confidence, and the other emotions, as associated with wonder; and we should thus be able to deduce more emotions than those which have obtained names in ordinary speech. Whence it is evident that the names of the emotions have been applied in accordance rather with their ordinary manifestations than with an accurate knowledge of their nature.

To wonder is opposed *Contempt*, which generally arises from the fact that, because we see someone wondering at, loving, or fearing something, or because something, at first sight, appears to be like things, which we ourselves wonder at, love, fear, c., we are, in consequence (III, 15 c, 27), determined to wonder at, love, or fear that thing. But if from the presence, or more accurate contemplation of the said thing, we are compelled to deny concerning it all that can be the cause of wonder, love, fear, c., the mind then, by the presence of the thing, remains determined to think rather of those qualities which are not in it, than of those which are in it; whereas, on the other hand, the presence of the object would cause it more particularly to regard that which is therein. As devotion springs from wonder at a thing which we love, so does *Derision* spring from contempt of a thing which we hate or fear, and *Scorn* from contempt of folly, as veneration from wonder at prudence. Lastly, we can conceive the emotions of love, hope, honor, c., in association with contempt, and can thence deduce other emotions, which are not distinguished one from another by any recognized name.

Prop. 53: When the mind regards itself and its own power of activity, it feels pleasure; and that pleasure is greater in proportion to the distinctness, wherewith it conceives itself and its own power of activity.

Corollary: This pleasure is fostered more and more, in proportion as a man conceives himself to be praised by others. For the more he conceives himself as praised by others, the more will he imagine them to be affected with pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself (III: 29 n); thus he is (III: 28) himself affected with greater pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself. QED.

Prop. 54: The mind endeavors to conceive only such things as assert its power of activity.

Prop. 55: When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels pain thereat.

Corollary: This pain is more and more fostered, if a man conceives that he is blamed by others; this may be proved in the same way as III: 53 c.

Note: This pain, accompanied by the idea of our own weakness, is called *humility*; the pleasure, which springs from the contemplation of ourselves, is called *self-love* or *self-complacency*. And inasmuch as this feeling is renewed as often as a man contemplates his own virtues, or his own power of activity, it follows that everyone is fond of narrating his own exploits, and displaying the force both of his body and mind, and also that, for this

reason, men are troublesome one to another. Again, it follows that men are naturally envious (III: 24 n, 22 n), rejoicing in the shortcomings of their equals, and feeling pain at their virtues. For whenever a man conceives his own actions, he is affected with pleasure (III: 53), in proportion as his actions display more perfection, and he conceives them more distinctly—that is (II: 40 n), in proportion as he can distinguish them from others, and regard them as something special. Therefore, a man will take most pleasure in contemplating himself, when he contemplates some quality which he denies to others. But, if that which he affirms of himself be attributable to the idea of man or animals in general, he will not be so greatly pleased: he will, on the contrary, feel pain, if he conceives that his own actions fall short when compared with those of others. This pain (III: 28) he will endeavor to remove, by putting a wrong construction on the actions of his equals, or by, as far as he can, embellishing his own.

It is thus apparent that men are naturally prone to hatred and envy, which latter is fostered by their education. For parents are accustomed to incite their children to virtue solely by the spur of honor and envy. But, perhaps, some will scruple to assent to what I have said, because we not seldom admire men's virtues, and venerate their possessors. In order to remove such doubts, I append the following corollary.

Prop. 56: There are as many kinds of pleasure, of pain, of desire, and of every emotion compounded of these, such as vacillations of spirit, or derived from these, such as love, hatred, hope, fear, etc., as there are kinds of objects, whereby we are affected.

Prop. 57: Any emotion of a given individual differs from the emotion of another individual, only in so far as the essence of the one individual differs from the essence of the other.

Note: Hence it follows, that the emotions of the animals which are called irrational (for after learning the origin of mind we cannot doubt that brutes feel) only differ from man's emotions, to the extent that brute nature differs from human nature. Horse and man are alike carried away by the desire of procreation; but the desire of the former is equine, the desire of the latter is human. So also the lusts and appetites of insects, fishes, and birds must needs vary according to the several natures. Thus, although each individual lives content and rejoices in that nature belonging to him wherein he has his being, yet the life, wherein each is content and rejoices, is nothing else but the idea, or soul, of the said individual, and hence the joy of one only differs in nature from the joy of another, to the extent that the essence of one differs from the essence of another. Lastly, it follows from the foregoing proposition, that there is no small difference between the joy which actuates, say, a drunkard, and the joy possessed by a philosopher, as I just mention here by the way. Thus far I have treated of the emotions attributable to man, in so far as he is passive. It remains to add a few words on those attributable to him in so far as he is active.

Prop. 58: Besides pleasure and desire, which are passivities or passions, there are other emotions derived from pleasure and desire, which are attributable to us, in so far as we are active.

Prop. 59: Among all the emotions attributable to the mind as active, there are none which cannot be referred to pleasure or pain.

Note: All actions following from emotion, which are attributable to the mind in virtue of its understanding, I set down to *strength of character (fortitudo)*, which I divide into *courage (animositas)* and *highmindedness (generositas)*. By *courage* I mean *the desire whereby every man strives to preserve his own being in accordance solely with the dictates of reason*. By *highmindedness* I mean *the desire where by every man endeavors, solely under the dictates of reason, to aid other men and to unite them to himself in friendship*. Those actions, therefore, which have regard solely to the good of the agent I set down to courage, those which aim at the good of others I set down to highmindedness. Thus temperance, sobriety, and presence of mind in danger, c., are varieties of courage; courtesy, mercy, c., are varieties of highmindedness.

I think I have thus explained, and displayed through their primary causes the principal emotions and vacillations of spirit, which arise from the combination of the three primary emotions, to wit, desire, pleasure, and pain. It is evident from what I have said, that we are in many ways driven about by external causes, and that like waves of the sea driven by contrary winds we toss to and fro unwitting of the issue and of our fate. But I have said, that I have only set forth the chief conflicting emotions not all that might be given. For, by proceeding in the same way as above, we can easily show that love is united to repentance, scorn, shame, etc. I think everyone will agree from what has been said, that the emotions may be compounded one with another in so many ways, and so many variations may arise therefrom, as to exceed all possibility of computation. However, for my purpose, it is enough to have enumerated the most important; to reckon up the rest which I have omitted would be more curious than profitable. It remains to remark concerning love, that it very often happens that while we are enjoying a thing which we longed for, the body, from the act of enjoyment, acquires a new disposition, whereby it is determined in another way, other images of things are aroused in it, and the mind begins to conceive and desire something fresh. For example, when we conceive something which generally delights us with its flavor, we desire to enjoy, that is, to eat it. But whilst we are thus enjoying it, the stomach is filled and the body is otherwise disposed. If, therefore, when the body is thus otherwise disposed, the image of the food which is present be stimulated, and consequently the endeavor or desire to eat it be stimulated also, the new disposition of the body will feel repugnance to the desire or attempt, and consequently the presence of the food which we formerly longed for will become odious. This revulsion of feeling is called *satiety* or weariness. For the rest, I have neglected the outward modifications of the body observable in emotions, such, for instance, as trembling, pallor, sobbing, laughter, c., for these are attributable to the body only, without any reference to the mind. Lastly, the definitions of the emotions require to be supplemented in a few points; I will therefore repeat them, interpolating such observations as I think should here and there be added.

Definitions of the Emotions

1. *Desire* is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived, as determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself.

Explanation: We have said above, in III: 9 n, that desire is appetite, with consciousness thereof; further, that appetite is the essence of man, in so far as it is determined to act in a

way tending to promote its own persistence. But, in the same note, I also remarked that, strictly speaking, I recognize no distinction between appetite and desire. For whether a man be conscious of his appetite or not, it remains one and the same appetite. Thus, in order to avoid the appearance of tautology, I have refrained from explaining desire by appetite; but I have taken care to define it in such a manner, as to comprehend, under one head, all those endeavors of human nature, which we distinguish by the terms appetite, will, desire, or impulse. I might, indeed, have said that desire is the essence of man, in so far as it is conceived as determined to a particular activity; but from such a definition (cf. II: 23) it would not follow that the mind can be conscious of its desire or appetite. Therefore, in order to imply the cause of such consciousness, it was necessary to add, *in so far as it is determined by some given modification*, c. For, by a modification of man's essence, we understand every disposition of the said essence, whether such disposition be innate, or whether it be conceived solely under the attribute of thought, or solely under the attribute of extension, or whether, lastly, it be referred simultaneously to both these attributes. By the term desire, then, I here mean all man's endeavors, impulses, appetites, and volitions, which vary according to each man's disposition, and are, therefore, not seldom opposed one to another, according as a man is drawn in different directions, and knows not where to turn.

2. *Pleasure* is the transition of a man from a less to a greater perfection.

3. *Pain* is the transition of a man from a greater to a less perfection.

Explanation: I say transition: for pleasure is not perfection itself. For, if man were born with the perfection to which he passes, he would possess the same, without the emotion of pleasure. This appears more clearly from the consideration of the contrary emotion, pain. No one can deny, that pain consists in the transition to a less perfection, and not in the less perfection itself: for a man cannot be pained, in so far as he partakes of perfection of any degree. Neither can we say, that pain consists in the absence of a greater perfection. For absence is nothing, whereas the emotion of pain is an activity; wherefore this activity can only be the activity of transition from a greater to a less perfection—in other words, it is an activity whereby a man's power of action is lessened or constrained (cf. III: 11 n). I pass over the definitions of merriment, stimulation, melancholy, and grief, because these terms are generally used in reference to the body, and are merely kinds of pleasure or pain.

4. *Wonder* is the conception (*imaginatio*) of anything, wherein the mind comes to a stand, because the particular concept in question has no connection with other concepts (cf. III: 52 and n).

Explanation: In II: 18 n. we showed the reason, why the mind, from the contemplation of one thing, straightway falls to the contemplation of another thing, namely, because the images of the two things are so associated and arranged, that one follows the other. This state of association is impossible, if the image of the thing be new; the mind will then be at a stand in the contemplation thereof, until it is determined by other causes to think of something else.

Thus the conception of a new object, considered in itself, is of the same nature as other conceptions; hence, I do not include wonder among the emotions, nor do I see why I should

so include it, inasmuch as this distraction of the mind arises from no positive cause drawing away the mind from other objects, but merely from the absence of a cause, which should determine the mind to pass from the contemplation of one object to the contemplation of another.

I, therefore, recognize only three primitive or primary emotions (as I said in III: 11 n), namely, pleasure, pain, and desire. I have spoken of wonder, simply because it is customary to speak of certain emotions springing from the three primitive ones by different names, when they are referred to the objects of our wonder. I am led by the same motive to add a definition of contempt.

5. *Contempt* is the conception of anything which touches the mind so little, that its presence leads the mind to imagine those qualities which are not in it, rather than such as are in it (cf. III: 52 n).

The definitions of veneration and scorn I here pass over, for I am not aware that any emotions are named after them.

6. *Love* is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.

Explanation: This definition explains sufficiently clearly the essence of love; the definition given by those authors who say that love is *the lover's wish to unite himself to the loved object* expresses a property, but not the essence of love; and, as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love's essence, they have been unable to acquire a true conception of its properties, accordingly their definition is on all hands admitted to be very obscure. It must, however, be noted, that when I say that it is a property of love, that the lover should wish to unite himself to the beloved object, I do not here mean by *wish* consent, or conclusion, or a free decision of the mind (for I have shown such, in II: 48, to be fictitious); neither do I mean a desire of being united to the loved object when it is absent, or of continuing in its presence when it is at hand; for love can be conceived without either of these desires; but by *wish* I mean the contentment, which is in the lover, on account of the presence of the beloved object, whereby the pleasure of the lover is strengthened, or at least maintained.

7. *Hatred* is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.

Explanation: These observations are easily grasped after what has been said in the explanation of the preceding definition (cf. also III: 13 n).

8. *Inclination* is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally a cause of pleasure.

9. *Aversion* is pain, accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally the cause of pain (cf. III: 15 n).

10. *Devotion* is love towards one whom we admire.

Explanation.—Wonder (*admiratio*) arises (as we have shown, III: 52) from the novelty of a thing. If, therefore, it happens that the object of our wonder is often conceived by us, we shall cease to wonder at it; thus we see that the emotion of devotion readily degenerates into simple love.

11. *Derision* is pleasure arising from our conceiving the presence of a quality, which we despise, in an object which we hate.

Explanation: In so far as we despise a thing which we hate, we deny existence thereof (III: 52 n), and to that extent rejoice (III: 20). But since we assume that man hates that which he derides, it follows that the pleasure in question is not without alloy (cf. III: 47 n).

12. *Hope* is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue.

13. *Fear* is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue (cf. III: 18 n).

Explanation: From these definitions it follows, that there is no hope unmingled with fear, and no fear unmingled with hope. For he who depends on hope and doubts concerning the issue of anything, is assumed to conceive something, which excludes the existence of the said thing in the future; therefore he, to this extent, feels pain (cf. III: 19); consequently, while dependent on hope, he fears for the issue. Contrariwise he, who fears, in other words doubts, concerning the issue of something which he hates, also conceives something which excludes the existence of the thing in question; to this extent he feels pleasure, and consequently to this extent he hopes that it will turn out as he desires (III: 20).

14. *Confidence* is pleasure arising from the idea of something past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.

15. *Despair* is pain arising from the idea of something past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.

Explanation: Thus confidence springs from hope, and despair from fear, when all cause for doubt as to the issue of an event has been removed: this comes to pass, because man conceives something past or future as present and regards it as such, or else because he conceives other things, which exclude the existence of the causes of his doubt. For, although we can never be absolutely certain of the issue of any particular event (II: 31 c), it may nevertheless happen that we feel no doubt concerning it. For we have shown, that to feel no doubt concerning a thing is not the same as to be quite certain of it (II: 49 n). Thus it may happen that we are affected by the same emotion of pleasure or pain concerning a thing past or future, as concerning the conception of a thing present; this I have already shown in III: 18, to which, with its note, I refer the reader.

16. *Joy* is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past, which has had an issue beyond our hope.

17. *Disappointment* is pain accompanied by the idea of something past, which has had an issue contrary to our hope.

18. *Pity* is pain accompanied by the idea of evil, which has befallen someone else whom we conceive to be like ourselves (cf. III: 22 n, 27 n).

Explanation: Between pity and sympathy (*misericordia*) there seems to be no difference, unless perhaps that the former term is used in reference to a particular action, and the latter in reference to a disposition.

19. *Approval* is love towards one who has done good to another.

20. *Indignation* is hatred towards one who has done evil to another.

Explanation: I am aware that these terms are employed in senses somewhat different from those usually assigned. But my purpose is to explain, not the meaning of words, but the nature of things. I therefore make use of such terms, as may convey my meaning without any violent departure from their ordinary signification. One statement of my method will suffice. As for the cause of the above-named emotions see III: 27 c1, 22 n.

21. *Partiality* is thinking too highly of anyone because of the love we bear him.

22. *Disparagement* is thinking too meanly of anyone, because we hate him.

Explanation: Thus partiality is an effect of love, and disparagement an effect of hatred: so that *partiality* may also be defined as *love, in so far as it induces a man to think too highly of a beloved object*. Contrariwise, *disparagement* may be defined as *hatred, in so far as it induces a man to think too meanly of a hated object*. cf. III: 26 n.

23. *Envy* is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be pained by another's good fortune, and to rejoice in another's evil fortune.

Explanation: Envy is generally opposed to sympathy, which, by doing some violence to the meaning of the word, may therefore be thus defined:

24. *Sympathy (misericordia)* is love, in so far as it induces a man to feel pleasure at another's good fortune, and pain at another's evil fortune.

Explanation: Concerning envy see III: 24 n, 32 n. These emotions also arise from pleasure or pain accompanied by the idea of something external, as cause either in itself or accidentally. I now pass on to other emotions, which are accompanied by the idea of something within as a cause.

25. *Self-approval* is pleasure arising from a man's contemplation of himself and his own power of action.

26. *Humility* is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his own weakness of body or mind.

Explanation: Self-complacency is opposed to humility, in so far as we thereby mean pleasure arising from a contemplation of our own power of action; but, in so far as we mean thereby pleasure accompanied by the idea of any action which we believe we have performed by the free decision of our mind, it is opposed to repentance, which we may thus define:

27. *Repentance* is pain accompanied by the idea of some action, which we believe we have performed by the free decision of our mind.

Explanation: The causes of these emotions we have set forth in III: 51 n, 53, 54, 55 and n. Concerning the free decision of the mind see II: 35 n. This is perhaps the place to call attention to the fact, that it is nothing wonderful that all those actions, which are commonly called *wrong*, are followed by pain, and all those, which are called *right*, are followed by pleasure. We can easily gather from what has been said, that this depends in great measure on education. Parents, by reprobating the former class of actions, and by frequently chiding their children because of them, and also by persuading to and praising the latter class, have brought it about, that the former should be associated with pain and the latter with pleasure. This is confirmed by experience. For custom and religion are not the same among all men, but that which some consider sacred others consider profane, and what some consider honorable others consider disgraceful. According as each man has been educated, he feels repentance for a given action or glories therein.

28. *Pride* is thinking too highly of one's self from self-love.

Explanation: Thus pride is different from partiality, for the latter term is used in reference to an external object, but pride is used of a man thinking too highly of himself. However, as partiality is the effect of love, so is pride the effect or property of *self-love*, which may therefore be thus defined, *love of self or self-approval, in so far as it leads a man to think too highly of himself*. To this emotion there is no contrary. For no one thinks too meanly of himself because of self-hatred; I say that no one thinks too meanly of himself, in so far as he conceives that he is incapable of doing this or that. For whatsoever a man imagines that he is incapable of doing, he imagines this of necessity, and by that notion he is so disposed, that he really cannot do that which he conceives that he cannot do. For, so long as he conceives that he cannot do it, so long is he not determined to do it, and consequently so long is it impossible for him to do it. However, if we consider such matters as only depend on opinion, we shall find it conceivable that a man may think too meanly of himself; for it may happen, that a man, sorrowfully regarding his own weakness, should imagine that he is despised by all men, while the rest of the world are thinking of nothing less than of despising him. Again, a man may think too meanly of himself, if he deny of himself in the present something in relation to a future time of which he is uncertain. As, for instance, if he should say that he is unable to form any clear conceptions, or that he can desire and do nothing but what is wicked and base, c. We may also say, that a man thinks too meanly of himself, when we see him from excessive fear of shame refusing to do things which others, his equals, venture. We can, therefore, set down as a contrary to pride an emotion which I will call self-

abasement, for as from self-complacency springs pride, so from humility springs self-abasement, which I will accordingly thus define:

29. *Self-abasement* is thinking too meanly of one's self by reason of pain.

Explanation: We are nevertheless generally accustomed to oppose pride to humility, but in that case we pay more attention to the effect of either emotion than to its nature. We are wont to call *proud* the man who boasts too much (III: 30 n), who talks of nothing but his own virtues and other people's faults, who wishes to be first; and lastly who goes through life with a style and pomp suitable to those far above him in station. On the other hand, we call *humble* the man who too often blushes, who confesses his faults, who sets forth other men's virtues, and who, lastly, walks with bent head and is negligent of his attire. However, these emotions, humility and self-abasement, are extremely rare. For human nature, considered in itself, strives against them as much as it can (see III: 13, 54); hence those, who are believed to be most self-abased and humble, are generally in reality the most ambitious and envious.

30. *Honor* is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action of our own, which we believe to be praised by others.

31. *Shame* is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of our own, which we believe to be blamed by others.

Explanation: On this subject see III: 30 n. But we should here remark the difference which exists between shame and modesty. Shame is the pain following the deed whereof we are ashamed. Modesty is the fear or dread of shame, which restrains a man from committing a base action. Modesty is usually opposed to shamelessness, but the latter is not an emotion, as I will duly show; however, the names of the emotions (as I have remarked already) have regard rather to their exercise than to their nature.

I have now fulfilled my task of explaining the emotions arising from pleasure and pain. I therefore proceed to treat of those which I refer to desire.

32. *Regret* is the desire or appetite to possess something, kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing, and at the same time constrained by the remembrance of other things which exclude the existence of it.

Explanation: When we remember a thing, we are by that very fact, as I have already said more than once, disposed to contemplate it with the same emotion as if it were something present; but this disposition or endeavor, while we are awake, is generally checked by the images of things which exclude the existence of that which we remember. Thus when we remember something which affected us with a certain pleasure, we by that very fact endeavor to regard it with the same emotion of pleasure as though it were present, but this endeavor is at once checked by the remembrance of things which exclude the existence of the thing in question. Wherefore regret is, strictly speaking, a pain opposed to that pleasure, which arises from the absence of something we hate (cf. III: 47 n). But, as the

name regret seems to refer to desire, I set this emotion down, among the emotions springing from desire.

33. *Emulation* is the desire of something, engendered in us by our conception that others have the same desire.

Explanation: He who runs away, because he sees others running away, or he who fears, because he sees others in fear; or again, he who, on seeing that another man has burnt his hand, draws towards him his own hand, and moves his body as though his own hand were burnt; such an one can be said to imitate another's emotion, but not to emulate him; not because the causes of emulation and imitation are different, but because it has become customary to speak of emulation only in him, who imitates that which we deem to be honorable, useful, or pleasant. As to the cause of emulation, cf. III: 28 and n. The reason why this emotion is generally coupled with envy may be seen from III: 22 and n.

34. *Thankfulness* or *Gratitude* is the desire or zeal springing from love, whereby we endeavor to benefit him, who with similar feelings of love has conferred a benefit on us. cf. III: 39 n and 40.

35. *Benevolence* is the desire of benefiting one whom we pity. cf. III: 28 n.

36. *Anger* is the desire, whereby through hatred we are induced to injure one whom we hate, III: 39.

37. *Revenge* is the desire whereby we are induced, through mutual hatred, to injure one who, with similar feelings, has injured us. (See III: 40 c2, n)

38. *Cruelty* or *savageness* is the desire, whereby a man is impelled to injure one whom we love or pity.

Explanation: To cruelty is opposed clemency, which is not a passive state of the mind, but a power whereby man restrains his anger and revenge.

39. *Timidity* is the desire to avoid a greater evil, which we dread, by undergoing a lesser evil. cf. III: 39 n.

40. *Daring* is the desire, whereby a man is set on to do something dangerous which his equals fear to attempt.

41. *Cowardice* is attributed to one, whose desire is checked by the fear of some danger which his equals dare to encounter.

Explanation: Cowardice is, therefore, nothing else but the fear of some evil, which most men are wont not to fear; hence I do not reckon it among the emotions springing from desire. Nevertheless, I have chosen to explain it here, because, in so far as we look to the desire, it is truly opposed to the emotion of daring.

42. *Consternation* is attributed to one, whose desire of avoiding evil is checked by amazement at the evil which he fears.

Explanation: Consternation is, therefore, a species of cowardice. But, inasmuch as consternation arises from a double fear, it may be more conveniently defined as a fear which keeps a man so bewildered and wavering, that he is not able to remove the evil. I say bewildered, in so far as we understand his desire of removing the evil to be constrained by his amazement. I say wavering, in so far as we understand the said desire to be constrained by the fear of another evil, which equally torments him: whence it comes to pass that he knows not, which he may avert of the two. On this subject, see III: 39 n, and III: 52 n. Concerning cowardice and daring, see III: 51 n.

43. *Courtesy*, or *deference* (*Humanitas seu modestia*), is the desire of acting in a way that should please men, and refraining from that which should displease them.

44. *Ambition* is the immoderate desire of power.

Explanation: Ambition is the desire, whereby all the emotions (cf. III: 28, 31) are fostered and strengthened; therefore this emotion can with difficulty be overcome. For, so long as a man is bound by any desire, he is at the same time necessarily bound by this. "The best men," says Cicero, "are especially led by honor. Even philosophers, when they write a book contemning honor, sign their names thereto," and so on.

45. *Luxury* is excessive desire, or even love of living sumptuously.

46. *Intemperance* is the excessive desire and love of drinking.

47. *Avarice* is the excessive desire and love of riches.

48. *Lust* is desire and love in the matter of sexual intercourse.

Explanation: Whether this desire be excessive or not, it is still called lust. These last five emotions (as I have shown in III: 41) have no contraries. For deference is a species of ambition cf. III: 29 n.

Again, I have already pointed out, that temperance, sobriety, and chastity indicate rather a power than a passivity of the mind. It may, nevertheless, happen, that an avaricious, an ambitious, or a timid man may abstain from excess in eating, drinking, or sexual indulgence, yet avarice, ambition, and fear are not contraries to luxury, drunkenness, and debauchery. For an avaricious man often is glad to gorge himself with food and drink at another man's expense. An ambitious man will restrain himself in nothing, so long as he thinks his indulgences are secret; and if he lives among drunkards and debauchees, he will, from the mere fact of being ambitious, be more prone to those vices. Lastly, a timid man does that which he would not. For though an avaricious man should, for the sake of avoiding death, cast his riches into the sea, he will none the less remain avaricious; so, also, if a lustful man is downcast, because he cannot follow his bent, he does not, on the ground of abstention, cease

to be lustful. In fact, these emotions are not so much concerned with the actual feasting, drinking, c., as with the appetite and love of such. Nothing, therefore, can be opposed to these emotions, but high-mindedness and valor, whereof I will speak presently.

The definitions of jealousy and other waverings of the mind I pass over in silence, first, because they arise from the compounding of the emotions already described; secondly, because many of them have no distinctive names, which shows that it is sufficient for practical purposes to have merely a general knowledge of them. However, it is established from the definitions of the emotions, which we have set forth, that they all spring from desire, pleasure, or pain, or, rather, that there is nothing besides these three; wherefore each is wont to be called by a variety of names in accordance with its various relations and extrinsic tokens. If we now direct our attention to these primitive emotions, and to what has been said concerning the nature of the mind, we shall be able thus to define the emotions, in so far as they are referred to the mind only.

General Definition of the Emotions

Emotion, which is called a passivity of the soul, is a confused idea, whereby the mind affirms concerning its body, or any part thereof, a force for existence (*existendi vis*) greater or less than before, and by the presence of which the mind is determined to think of one thing rather than another.

Explanation: I say, first, that emotion or passion of the soul is a *confused idea*. For we have shown that the mind is only passive, in so far as it has inadequate or confused ideas. (III: 3) I say, further, *whereby the mind affirms concerning its body or any part thereof a force for existence greater than before*. For all the ideas of bodies, which we possess, denote rather the actual disposition of our own body (II: 16 c2) than the nature of an external body. But the idea which constitutes the reality of an emotion must denote or express the disposition of the body, or of some part thereof, which is possessed by the body, or some part thereof, because its power of action or force for existence is increased or diminished, helped or hindered. But it must be noted that, when I say *a greater or less force for existence* than before, I do not mean that the mind compares the present with the past disposition of the body, but that the idea which constitutes the reality of an emotion affirms something of the body, which, in fact, involves more or less of reality than before.

And inasmuch as the essence of mind consists in the fact (II: 11, 13), that it affirms the actual existence of its own body, and inasmuch as we understand by perfection the very essence of a thing, it follows that the mind passes to greater or less perfection, when it happens to affirm concerning its own body, or any part thereof, something involving more or less reality than before.

When, therefore, I said above that the power of the mind is increased or diminished, I merely meant that the mind had formed of its own body, or of some part thereof, an idea involving more or less of reality, than it had already affirmed concerning its own body. For the excellence of ideas, and the actual power of thinking are measured by the excellence of the object. Lastly, I have added *by the presence of which the mind is determined to think of one*

thing rather than another, so that, besides the nature of pleasure and pain, which the first part of the definition explains, I might also express the nature of desire.

Part IV: Of Human Bondage, Or the Strength of the Emotions

Definitions

1. By *good* I mean that which we certainly know to be useful to us.
2. By *evil* I mean that which we certainly know to be a hindrance to us in the attainment of any good.

(Concerning these terms see the foregoing preface towards the end.)

3. Particular things I call *contingent* in so far as, while regarding their essence only, we find nothing therein, which necessarily asserts their existence or excludes it.
4. Particular things I call *possible* in so far as, while regarding the causes whereby they must be produced, we know not, whether such causes be determined for producing them.

(In I: 33 n1, I drew no distinction between possible and contingent, because there was in that place no need to distinguish them accurately.)

5. By *conflicting emotions* I mean those which draw a man in different directions, though they are of the same kind, such as luxury and avarice, which are both species of love, and are contraries, not by nature, but by accident.
6. What I mean by emotion felt towards a thing, future, present, and past, I explained in III: 18, n1, n2, which see.

(But I should here also remark, that we can only distinctly conceive distance of space or time up to a certain definite limit; that is, all objects distant from us more than two hundred feet, or whose distance from the place where we are exceeds that which we can distinctly conceive, seem to be an equal distance from us, and all in the same plane; so also objects, whose time of existing is conceived as removed from the present by a longer interval than we can distinctly conceive, seem to be all equally distant from the present, and are set down, as it were, to the same moment of time.)

7. By an *end*, for the sake of which we do something, I mean a desire.
8. By *virtue* (*virtus*) and *power* I mean the same thing; that is (III: 7), virtue, in so far as it is referred to man, is a man's nature or essence, in so far as it has the power of effecting what can only be understood by the laws of that nature.

Axiom

There is no individual thing in nature, than which there is not another more powerful and strong. Whatsoever thing be given, there is something stronger whereby it can be destroyed.

Propositions

Prop. 1: No positive quality possessed by a false idea is removed by the presence of what is true in virtue of its being true.

Prop. 2: We are only passive in so far as we are a part of Nature, which cannot be conceived by itself without other parts.

Prop. 3: The force whereby a man persists in existing is limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes.

Prop. 4: It is impossible, that man should not be a part of Nature, or that he should be capable of undergoing no changes, save such as can be understood through his nature only as their adequate cause.

Corollary: Hence it follows, that man is necessarily always a prey to his passions, that he follows and obeys the general order of nature, and that he accommodates himself thereto, as much as the nature of things demands.

Prop. 5: The power and increase of every passion, and its persistence in existing are not defined by the power, whereby we ourselves endeavor to persist in existing, but by the power of an external cause compared with our own.

Prop. 6: The force of any passion or emotion can overcome the rest of a man's activities or power, so that the emotion becomes obstinately fixed to him.

Prop. 7: An emotion can only be controlled or destroyed by another emotion contrary thereto, and with more power for controlling emotion.

Prop. 8: The knowledge of good and evil is nothing else, but the emotions of pleasure or pain, in so far as we are conscious thereof.

Prop. 9: An emotion, whereof we conceive the cause to be with us at the present time, is stronger than if we did not conceive the cause to be with us.

Corollary: The image of something past or future, that is, of a thing which we regard as in relation to time past or time future, to the exclusion of time present, is, when other conditions are equal, weaker than the image of something present; consequently an emotion felt towards what is past or future is less intense, other conditions being equal, than an emotion felt towards something present.

Prop. 10: Towards something future, which we conceive as close at hand, we are affected more intensely, than if we conceive that its time for existence is separated from the present by a longer interval; so too by the remembrance of what we conceive to have not long passed away we are affected more intensely, than if we conceive that it has long passed away.

Prop. 11: An emotion towards that which we conceive as necessary is, when other conditions are equal, more intense than an emotion towards that which is possible, or contingent, or non-necessary.

Prop. 12: An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to exist at the present time, and which we conceive is possible, is more intense, other things being equal, than an emotion towards a thing contingent.

Corollary: An emotion towards a thing, which we know not to exist in the present, and which we conceive as contingent, is far fainter, than if we conceive the thing to be present with us.

Prop. 13: Emotion towards a thing contingent, which we know not to exist in the present, is, other conditions being equal, fainter than an emotion towards a thing past.

Prop. 14: A true knowledge of good and evil cannot check any emotion by virtue of being true, but only in so far as it is considered as an emotion.

Prop. 15: Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil can be quenched or checked by many other desires arising from the emotions, whereby we are assailed.

Prop. 16: Desire arising from the knowledge of good and evil, in so far as such knowledge regards what is future, may be more easily controlled or quenched, than the desire for what is agreeable at the present moment.

Prop. 17: Desire arising from the true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as such knowledge is concerned with what is contingent, can be controlled far more easily still, than desire for things that are at present.

Prop. 18: Desire arising from pleasure is, other things being equal, stronger than desire arising from pain.

Prop. 19: Every man, by the laws of his nature, necessarily desires or shrinks from that which he deems to be good or bad.

Prop. 20: The more every man endeavors and is able to seek what is useful to him, in other words to preserve his own being, the more is he endowed with virtue; on the contrary, in proportion as a man neglects to seek what is useful to him, that is, to preserve his own being, he is wanting in power.

Prop. 21: No one can rightly desire to be blessed, to act rightly, and to live rightly, without at the same time wishing to be, to act, and to live, in other words, to actually exist.

Prop. 22: No virtue can be conceived as prior to this endeavor to preserve one's own being.

Prop. 23: Man, in so far as he is determined to a particular action because he has inadequate ideas, cannot be absolutely said to act in obedience to virtue; he can only be so described, in so far as he is determined for the action, because he understands.

Prop. 24: To act absolutely in obedience to virtue, is in us the same thing as to act, to live, or to preserve one's being (these three terms are identical in meaning) in accordance with the dictate of reason on the basis of seeking what is useful to one's self.

Prop. 25: No one wishes to preserve his being for the sake of anything else.

Prop. 26: Whatsoever we endeavor in obedience to reason is nothing further than to understand; neither does the mind, in so far as it makes use of reason, judge anything to be useful to it, save such things as are conducive to understanding.

Prop. 27: We know nothing to be certainly good or evil, save such things as really conduce to understanding, or such as are able to hinder us from understanding.

Prop. 28: The mind's highest good is the knowledge of God, and the mind's highest virtue is to know God.

Prop. 29: No individual thing, which is entirely different from our own nature, can help or check our power of activity, and absolutely nothing can do us good or harm, unless it has something in common with our nature.

Prop. 30: A thing cannot be bad for us through the quality which it has in common with our nature, but it is bad for us, in so far as it is contrary to our nature.

Prop. 31: In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature, it is necessarily good.

Prop. 32: In so far as men are a prey to passion, they cannot, in that respect, be said to be naturally in harmony.

Prop. 33: Men can differ in nature, in so far as they are assailed by those emotions, which are passions or passive states; and to this extent one and the same man is variable and inconstant.

Prop. 34: In so far as men are assailed by emotions which are passions, they can be contrary one to another.

Prop. 35: In so far only as men live in obedience to reason, do they always necessarily agree in nature.

Prop. 36: The highest good of those who follow virtue is common to all, and therefore all can equally rejoice therein.

Prop. 37: The good, which every man who follows after virtue desires for himself, he will also desire for other men, and so much the more, in proportion as he has a greater knowledge of God.

Prop. 38: Whatsoever disposes the human body, so as to render it capable of being affected in an increased number of ways, or of affecting external bodies in an increased number of ways, is useful to man; and is so, in proportion as the body is thereby rendered more capable

of being affected or of affecting other bodies in an increased number of ways; contrariwise, whatsoever renders the body less capable in this respect is hurtful to man.

Prop. 39: Whatsoever brings about the preservation of the proportion of motion and rest, which the parts of the human body mutually possess, is good; contrariwise, whatsoever causes a change in such proportion is bad.

Note: The extent to which such causes can injure or be of service to the mind will be explained in the Fifth Part. But I would here remark that I consider that a body undergoes death, when the proportion of motion and rest which obtained mutually among its several parts is changed. For I do not venture to deny that a human body, while keeping the circulation of the blood and other properties, wherein the life of a body is thought to consist, may none the less be changed into another nature totally different from its own. There is no reason, which compels me to maintain that a body does not die, unless it becomes a corpse; nay, experience would seem to point to the opposite conclusion. It sometimes happens, that a man undergoes such changes, that I should hardly call him the same. As I have heard tell of a certain Spanish poet, who had been seized with sickness, and though he recovered therefrom yet remained so oblivious of his past life, that he would not believe the plays and tragedies he had written to be his own: indeed, he might have been taken for a grown-up child, if he had also forgotten his native tongue. If this instance seems incredible, what shall we say of infants? A man of ripe age deems their nature so unlike his own, that he can only be persuaded that he too has been an infant by the analogy of other men. However, I prefer to leave such questions undiscussed, lest I should give ground to the superstitious for raising new issues.

Prop. 40: Whatsoever conduces to man's social life, or causes men to live together in harmony, is useful, whereas whatsoever brings discord into a State is bad.

Prop. 41: Pleasure in itself is not bad but good; contrariwise, pain in itself is bad.

Prop. 42: Mirth cannot be excessive, but is always good; contrariwise, Melancholy is always bad.

Prop. 43: Stimulation may be excessive and bad; on the other hand, grief may be good, in so far as stimulation or pleasure is bad.

Prop. 44: Love and desire may be excessive.

Prop. 45: Hatred can never be good.

Prop. 46: He, who lives under the guidance of reason, endeavors, as far as possible, to rend back love, or kindness, for other men's hatred, anger, contempt, etc. towards him.

Note: He who chooses to avenge wrongs with hatred is assuredly wretched. But he, who strives to conquer hatred with love, fights his battle in joy and confidence; he withstands many as easily as one, and has very little need of fortune's aid. Those whom he vanquishes yield joyfully, not through failure, but through increase in their powers; all these

consequences follow so plainly from the mere definitions of love and understanding, that I have no need to prove them in detail.

Prop. 47: Emotions of hope and fear cannot be in themselves good.

Prop. 48: The emotions of over-esteem and disparagement are always bad.

Prop. 49: Over-esteem is apt to render its object proud.

Prop. 50: Pity, in a man who lives under the guidance of reason, is in itself bad and useless.

Prop. 51: Approval is not repugnant to reason, but can agree therewith and arise therefrom.

Prop. 52: Self-approval may arise from reason, and that which arises from reason is the highest possible.

Prop. 53: Humility is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason.

Prop. 54: Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason, but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or infirm.

Prop. 55: Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme ignorance of self.

Prop. 56: Extreme pride or dejection indicates extreme infirmity of spirit.

Prop. 57: The proud man delights in the company of flatterers and parasites, but hates the company of the high-minded.

Prop. 58: Honor (gloria) is not repugnant to reason, but may arise therefrom.

Prop. 59: To all the actions, whereto we are determined by emotions, wherein the mind is passive, we can be determined without emotion by reason.

Prop. 60: Desire arising from a pleasure or pain that is, not attributable to the whole body, but only to one or certain part's thereof, is without utility in respect to man as a whole.

Prop. 61: Desire which springs from reason cannot be excessive.

Prop. 62: In so far as the mind conceives a thing under the dictate of reason, it is affected equally, whether the idea be of a thing present, past, or future.

Prop. 63: He who is led by fear, and does good in order to escape evil, is not led by reason.

Prop. 64: The knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge.

Prop. 65: Under the guidance of reason we should pursue the greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils.

Prop. 66: We may, under the guidance of reason, seek a greater good in the future in preference to a lesser good in the present, and we may seek a lesser evil in the present in preference to a greater evil in the future.

Prop. 67: A free man thinks of nothing less than a death; and his wisdom is a meditation not of death, but of life.

Prop. 68: If men were born free, they would, so long as they remained free, form no conception of good or evil.

Prop. 69: The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great, when it declines dangers, as when it overcomes them.

Prop. 70: The free man, who lives among the ignorant, strives, as far as he can, to avoid receiving favors from them.

Prop. 71: Only free men are thoroughly grateful, one to another.

Prop. 72: The free man never acts fraudulently, but always in good faith.

Prop. 73: The man, who is guided by reason, is more free in a State, where he lives under a general system of law, than in solitude, where he is independent.

Appendix C

Part V: On the Power of the Understanding, Or of Human Freedom

Propositions

Prop. 1: Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in the mind, so are the modifications of the body or the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and associated in the body.

Prop. 2: If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion, from the thought of an external cause, and unite it to other thoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that external cause, and also the vacillations of spirit, which arise from these emotions, be destroyed.

Prop. 3: An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof.

Prop. 4: There is no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.

Prop. 5: An emotion towards a thing which we conceive simply, and not as necessary, or as contingent, or as possible, is, other conditions being equal, greater than any other emotion.

Prop. 6: The mind has greater power over the emotions, and is less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as necessary.

Prop. 7: Emotions, which are aroused or spring from reason, if we take account of time, are stronger than those, which are attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent.

Prop. 8: An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused.

Prop. 9: An emotion, which is attributable to many and diverse causes, which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion itself, is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto, and less affected towards each of its causes, than if it were a different and equally powerful emotion, attributable to fewer causes or to a single cause.

Prop. 10: So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the modifications of our body according to the intellectual order.

Note: By this power of rightly arranging and associating the bodily modifications we can guard ourselves from being easily affected by evil emotions. For (V: 7) a greater force is needed for controlling the emotions, when they are arranged and associated according to the intellectual order, than when they are uncertain and unsettled. The best we can do, therefore, so long as we do not possess a perfect knowledge of our emotions, is to frame a system of

right conduct, or fixed practical precepts, to commit it to memory, and to apply it forthwith to the particular circumstances which now and again meet us in life, so that our imagination may become fully imbued therewith, and that it may be always ready to our hand. For instance, we have laid down among the rules of life (IV: 46 and n), that hatred should be overcome with love or high-mindedness, and not requited with hatred in return. Now, that this precept of reason may be always ready to our hand in time of need, we should often think over and reflect upon the wrongs generally committed by men, and in what manner and way they may be best warded off by high-mindedness: we shall thus associate the idea of wrong with the idea of this precept, which accordingly will always be ready for use when a wrong is done to us (II: 18) If we keep also in readiness the notion of our true advantage, and of the good which follows from mutual friendships, and common fellowships; further, if we remember that complete acquiescence is the result of the right way of life (IV: 52), and that men, no less than everything else, act by the necessity of their nature: in such case I say the wrong, or the hatred, which commonly arises therefrom, will engross a very small part of our imagination and will be easily overcome; or, if the anger which springs from a grievous wrong be not overcome easily, it will nevertheless be overcome, though not without a spiritual conflict, far sooner than if we had not thus reflected on the subject beforehand. As is indeed evident from V: 6, 7, 8. We should, in the same way, reflect on courage as a means of overcoming fear; the ordinary dangers of life should frequently be brought to mind and imagined, together with the means whereby through readiness of resource and strength of mind we can avoid and overcome them. But we must note, that in arranging our thoughts and conceptions we should always bear in mind that which is good in every individual thing (IV: 43 c; III: 59), in order that we may always be determined to action by an emotion of pleasure. For instance, if a man sees that he is too keen in the pursuit of honor, let him think over its right use, the end for which it should be pursued, and the means whereby he may attain it. Let him not think of its misuse, and its emptiness, and the fickleness of mankind, and the like, whereof no man thinks except through a morbidness of disposition; with thoughts like these do the most ambitious most torment themselves, when they despair of gaining the distinctions they hanker after, and in thus giving vent to their anger would fain appear wise. Wherefore it is certain that those, who cry out the loudest against the misuse of honor and the vanity of the world, are those who most greedily covet it. This is not peculiar to the ambitious, but is common to all who are ill-used by fortune, and who are infirm in spirit. For a poor man also, who is miserly, will talk incessantly of the misuse of wealth and of the vices of the rich; whereby he merely torments himself, and shows the world that he is intolerant, not only of his own poverty, but also of other people's riches. So, again, those who have been ill received by a woman they love think of nothing but the inconstancy, treachery, and other stock faults of the fair sex; all of which they consign to oblivion, directly they are again taken into favor by their sweetheart. Thus he who would govern his emotions and appetite solely by the love of freedom strives, as far as he can, to gain a knowledge of the virtues and their causes, and to fill his spirit with the joy which arises from the true knowledge of them: he will in no wise desire to dwell on men's faults, or to carp at his fellows, or to revel in a false show of freedom. Whosoever will diligently observe and practice these precepts (which indeed are not difficult) will verily, in a short space of time, be able, for the most part, to direct his actions according to the commandments of reason.

Prop. 11: In proportion as a mental image is referred to more objects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, and affects the mind more.

Prop. 12: The mental images of things are more easily associated with the images referred to things which we clearly and distinctly understand, than with others.

Prop. 13: A mental image is more often vivid, in proportion as it is associated with a greater number of other images.

Prop. 14: The mind can bring it about, that all bodily modifications or images of things may be referred to the idea of God.

Prop. 15: He, who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions, loves God, and so much the more in proportion as he more understands himself and his emotions.

Prop. 16: This love towards God must hold the chief place in the mind.

Prop. 17: God is without passion, neither is he affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain.

Corollary: Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate anyone. For God (by the foregoing Prop.) is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain, consequently (III: emot6, emot7) he does not love or hate anyone.

Prop. 18: No one can hate God.

Prop. 19: He, who loves God, cannot endeavor, that God should love him in return.

Prop. 20: This love towards God cannot be stained by the emotion of envy or jealousy; contrariwise, it is the more fostered, in proportion as we conceive a greater number of men to be joined by God by the same bond of love.

Prop. 21: The mind can only imagine anything, or remember what is past, while the body endures.

Prop. 22: Nevertheless in God there is necessarily an idea, which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the form of eternity.

Prop. 23: The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal.

Prop. 24: The more we understand particular things, the more do we understand God.

Prop. 25: The highest endeavor of the mind, and the highest virtue, is to understand things by intuition.

Prop. 26: In proportion as the mind is more capable of understanding things by intuition, it desires more so to understand things.

Prop. 27: From intuition arises the highest possible mental acquiescence.

Prop. 28: The endeavor or desire to know things by intuition cannot arise from opinion, but from reason.

Prop. 29: Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of eternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the present actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity.

Prop. 30: Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived through God.

Prop. 31: Intuition depends on the mind, as its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal.

Prop. 32: Whatsoever we understand by intuition, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by the idea of God as cause.

Prop. 33: The intellectual love of God, which arises from intuition, is eternal.

Prop. 34: The mind is, only while the body endures, subject to those emotions, which are attributable to passions.

Prop. 35: God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love.

Prop. 36: The intellectual love of the mind towards God is that very love of God, whereby God loves himself, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through the essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity; in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love, wherewith God loves himself.

Prop. 37: There is nothing in nature, which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which can take it away.

Prop. 38: In proportion as the mind understands more things by reason and intuition, it is less subject to those emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death.

Prop. 39: He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities, possesses a soul whereof the greatest part is eternal.

Prop. 40: In proportion as each thing possesses more of perfection, so is it more active, and less passive; and, vice versa, in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect.

Prop. 41: Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we should still consider as of primary importance piety and religion, and generally all things, which in Part IV we showed to be attributable to courage and high-mindedness.

Prop. 42: Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our lusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able to control our lusts.